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1 Introduction 
 
 
There are many expressions in English the content of which is sensitive to, or depend on, the 
context in which they are uttered. Different utterances of the expression ‘here’ may refer to 
different locations depending on the location of the speaker. Similarly, the expression ‘that’ 
may refer to different objects in different contexts. In one context, ‘that’ may refer to a book, 
in another context it may refer to a tree. The expressions ‘here’ and ‘that’ are prime examples 
of what we may call ‘context sensitive expressions’. Context sensitivity is a phenomenon that 
has been studied by philosophers of language who are interested in the workings of natural 
languages such as English. However, the phenomenon of context sensitivity has also attracted 
the interest of philosophers of other disciplines such as epistemology and metaphysics. By 
postulating that a certain expression, or perhaps even a class of expressions, is context 
sensitive, these theorists hope to provide solutions to epistemological or metaphysical 
problems. 
 Contextualism about knowledge ascriptions is a view that has received a lot of 
attention and has been at the centre of much debate in recent years. Simply put, contextualism 
about knowledge ascriptions (henceforth just ‘contextualism’) is the view that the English 
expression ‘know’ as it occurs in ascriptions of propositional knowledge is context sensitive. 
One can ascribe knowledge to a subject in one context, while denying knowledge to the same 
or a similarly positioned subject in another context, but still be speaking truly in both cases. 
Prominent defenders of contextualism in the past decade include Stewart Cohen, Keith 
DeRose and David Lewis. The contributions of Stewart Cohen and Keith DeRose will be at 
the centre of the discussion of contextualism which I will undertake here. In particular, I will 
put a lot of emphasis on the contributions of Keith DeRose as he has addressed many of the 
questions that I will be concerned with. Additionally, I will draw on the work of non-
contextualists such as, among others, John Hawthorne, Jason Stanley and Timothy 
Williamson. In the case of both contextualists and non-contextualists, I will focus on the 
contributions to the debate in it is most recent incarnation to the exclusion of the historical 
antecedents of the positions and arguments under discussion. 
As a semantic thesis about the expression ‘know’ in English, it seems appropriate that 
a discussion of contextualism should belong to the philosophy of language, and more 
specifically to semantics. However, contextualism promises to have significant implications 
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for epistemology, especially if one takes knowledge to be as central to epistemology as 
Timothy Williamson (2000) has argued that it is. Contextualist solutions have been offered 
for important epistemological problems such as the challenge posed by sceptical arguments.1 
According to the picture offered by the contextualists with respect to providing a solution to 
the problem of scepticism, an utterance of the sentence ‘I know that I have hands’ will be true 
in most everyday contexts where we are not considering any radical sceptical possibilities, 
assuming of course that the subject has hands.2 However, when discussing epistemology and 
considering the sceptical scenario that we are handless brains in vats, an utterance of the 
sentence ‘I know that I have hands’ might be false. Indeed, the prospect of providing a 
response to the problem of epistemological scepticism has probably been one of the main 
motivating factors behind contextualism. Keith DeRose emphasizes this when he says, 
‘Contextualist theories of knowledge attributions have almost invariably been developed with 
an eye toward providing some kind of answer to philosophical skepticism’ (1995, p. 4). 
However, contextualism as I have presented it is a semantic thesis and it appears 
problematic to accept a semantic thesis solely on the basis of its application to 
epistemological problems such as the problem of scepticism. Herman Cappelen and Ernie 
Lepore make the following point: 
 
There can’t be metaphysical, epistemological, or moral arguments for an expression being context 
sensitive. If an English expression e is context sensitive, then that’s a fact about English and it can only 
be established by whatever procedures semanticists employ to establish such facts. (Cappelen and 
Lepore 2003, p. 43) 
 
As a result of this, the contextualists have felt the need to find evidence for contextualism. In 
attempting to do this, contextualists have looked to our ordinary use of sentences containing 
the expression ‘know’. Typically this has involved presenting a pair of cases with the subjects 
in both cases being in a similar epistemic position with respect to a true proposition. The 
contextualists argue that while it seems correct to ascribe knowledge to the subject in one of 
the cases, it also seems correct to deny knowledge to the subject in the other case. However, 
the cases only differ with respect to features which are not generally considered to be 
                                                 
1 David Lewis (1996) argues that contextualism is also in a position to provide a solution to other central 
epistemological problems such as the lottery problem and the Gettier problem. Stewart Cohen (1998) discusses 
Lewis’ proposal, but while he agrees that contextualism provides a solution to problem of scepticism and the 
lottery, he finds a contextualist solution more problematic in the case of the Gettier problem. 
2 The precise mechanics behind this change from the everyday context to the epistemological context can vary 
between different ways of working out the contextualist position. I will not get into those details since I will not 
be discussing the application of contextualism to the problem of scepticism. 
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epistemically relevant. From this the contextualists conclude that the expression ‘know’ is 
context sensitive. 
It is cases such as these, and the evidence that they allegedly provide for 
contextualism, that I will discuss in this thesis. In doing so, I will focus on two cases 
presented by Stewart Cohen (1999) and Keith DeRose (1992) respectively. I do not intend to 
undertake a comprehensive discussion of the merits and flaws of contextualism. For the most 
part I will ignore the objections that have been raised directly against contextualism insofar as 
they do not touch on the evidence for contextualism. Rather, I want to focus on the cases that 
contextualists have advanced as evidence for their position. Nor will I undertake a further 
discussion of the epistemological implications of contextualism, including the potential 
application to the problem of scepticism that I briefly mentioned above. 
It should be noted that I do not wish to rule out the possibility that there are other ways 
of providing evidence for contextualism than the cases I will be discussing. For instance, if 
one takes the position that all vague expressions are context sensitive, one could find support 
for the view that ‘know’ is context sensitive by arguing that it is vague. However, even 
leaving the merits of such an argument aside, it is an open question whether this is what the 
contextualists have in mind when they argue that ‘know’ is context sensitive. Among other 
things, it is unclear how this version of contextualism could be used to provide a response to 
the sceptical arguments.3 I propose to leave such considerations aside and focus on the cases 
presented by Cohen and DeRose. 
My overall aim is to present contextualism along with some of the cases which are 
thought to motivate this position, and then undertake a critical discussion of these cases with 
respect to the question of whether they provide evidence for contextualism. This overall aim 
will be reflected in the structure of my thesis. I will begin by giving a more detailed and 
precise formulation of contextualism (section 2). This will involve providing a more precise 
formulation of what it means for the expression ‘know’ to be context sensitive. Moreover, I 
will mention some of the other positions in the debate and how they differ from contextualism 
in order to cast further light on contextualism and to place it in the theoretical landscape. Thus 
having stated the contextualist position, I give a more thorough presentation of a pair of 
typical cases that contextualists claim provide evidence for their position (section 3). This 
paves the way for the main part of the thesis which will be a discussion of some problems 
with taking the cases in question to provide evidence for contextualism. I begin this part of the 
                                                 
3 This seems to be quite close to Stephen Schiffer’s (1996, p. 327-328) thoughts on these matters. 
 3
thesis by raising some initial complications (Section 4). In this section I look at some data that 
contextualists have tended not to focus on, and discuss the worry that the cases appealed to by 
the contextualists are not psychologically realistic. Then I turn to a discussion of the type of 
argument that contextualists rely on in order to draw the conclusion that ‘know’ is context 
sensitive from the cases in question (section 5). The main part of the discussion will centre on 
the question of whether the cases really require a treatment in terms of semantic context 
sensitivity, or whether there is an alternative explanation in terms of warranted assertability 
(section 6). Finally, I will connect the discussion of the evidence for contextualism with the 
topic of semantic blindness (section 7). At the end I make a summary of the discussion and 
offer some concluding remarks (section 8). 
 4
2 Contextualism about Knowledge Ascriptions 
 
 
In order to undertake a proper discussion of the evidence for contextualism I will begin by 
providing a more precise formulation of the contextualist position. On the understanding of 
contextualism that I will be concerned with here, contextualism is the view that the expression 
‘know’ (including its different inflectional forms, such as third person singular and past tense) 
is context sensitive. My way of putting the issue differs slightly from for instance Jason 
Stanley (2005) and Keith DeRose (1992), who prefer to say that contextualism is the view 
that knowledge ascriptions (i.e. knowledge-ascribing and knowledge-denying sentences) are 
context sensitive. However, I take this point to be primarily a matter of terminology. 
 In section 2.1 I provide a more precise and detailed formulation of what it means for 
‘know’ to be a context sensitive expression, and make a few clarifying remarks regarding 
what the contextualist thesis amounts to. In section 2.2 I look at different ways of further 
developing contextualism. The last two sections deal with alternatives to contextualism. I 
present invariantism as an alternative to contextualism in section 2.3 and relativism in section 
2.4. The aim in these two sections is to further clarify the contextualist position by looking at 
how it differs from alternative positions. 
 
2.1 The Context Sensitivity of ‘Know’ 
Since contextualism is the thesis that ‘know’ is a context sensitive expression, it is useful to 
have a more precise formulation of what this amounts to. Following the general schema for 
stating what it means for an expression to be context sensitive used by Herman Cappelen and 
Ernie Lepore (2005b, p. 146), we may formulate the context sensitivity of ‘know’ in two 
different ways: 
 
(CS')  To say that ‘know’ is context sensitive is to say that its contribution to the truth
  conditions of utterances u of a sentence S containing ‘know’ references various
  aspects of the context of u. 
(CS'')   To say that ‘know’ is context sensitive is to say that its contribution to the
  propositions expressed by utterances of sentences containing ‘know’ varies
  from context to context. 
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This means that different utterances of a sentence containing ‘know’, can express different 
propositions, or alternatively, have different truth conditions, in different contexts.4 In the 
following I will mostly put the context sensitivity of ‘know’ in terms of a variation in truth 
conditions, following (CS'). However, I do not intend the use of one rather the other to convey 
any substantial theoretical commitments, but will use the definitions as convenient, and so I 
do not see any reason to make an explicit choice between (CS') and (CS'').5 This reflects my 
intention to remain as neutral as possible with respect to questions about the nature of 
semantic content, such as the question of whether the semantic content of an utterance of a 
sentence is exhausted by its truth conditions, or whether the semantic content is a proposition 
which incorporates the truth conditions of the utterance. 
We can further illustrate what context sensitivity is by means of an example. Certain 
expressions are obviously context sensitive. Take for instance the indexical ‘I’ as it occurs in 
sentence (1). 
 
(1)   I am a philosophy student. 
 
The contribution of the expression ‘I’ in sentence (1) to the proposition expressed or the truth 
conditions of an utterance of the sentence, depends on who is the speaker in the context in 
which (1) is uttered. Since different utterances of (1) may thus express different propositions 
and have different truth conditions, it may be true as uttered by one speaker, for instance 
myself, and false as uttered in a context with a different speaker (i.e. someone who is not a 
philosophy student).6 The contextualists argue that similar considerations apply in the case of 
‘know’.7
 
(2)   Al Gore knows that George W. Bush is the President of the United States. 
 
                                                 
4 I will talk about utterances rather than sentences of expression-in-context. While this may seem to suggest a 
focus on spoken uses of language, this is not my intention. The discussion is meant to cover written inscriptions 
as well. 
5 It will for instance be convenient to appeal to the difference between truth conditions and warranted 
assertability conditions. 
6 For ease of exposition, I will not be careful about whether I attribute truth and falsity to utterances of sentences, 
the sentences themselves, ascriptions and denials of knowledge, assertions (i.e. the speech act) or the proposition 
expressed by an utterance of a sentence. My intended use does therefore not reflect any view about what the 
ultimate bearers of truth and falsity are. For instance, if one finds it problematic to attribute truth to utterances 
one might view the truth or falsity of an utterance as derived from the truth or falsity of the proposition it 
expresses. 
7 One should not conclude from this that contextualism requires ‘know’ to be an indexical like ‘I’. There may be 
other ways of implementing the context sensitivity of ‘know’ than indexicality. See section 2.2. 
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According to contextualism the expression ‘know’ in sentence (2) is similar to the expression 
‘I’ in that its contribution to the proposition expressed by an utterance of the sentence depends 
on certain features of the context, for the moment leaving it an open question exactly which 
features of the context are important and how the context sensitivity is implemented. In an 
ordinary context the truth conditions of an utterance of (2) may be such that it comes out true. 
On the other hand, an utterance of (2) may be false in a more demanding context, perhaps one 
in which sceptical possibilities are salient or a context in which the possibilities of a coup 
d'état has been raised. 
 Note that the discussion here only concerns ‘know’ as it occurs in ascriptions of 
propositional knowledge, that is sentences of the form ‘S knows that p’, in which ‘know’ 
denotes a relation between an individual and a proposition.8 I will not discuss ‘know’ as it 
occurs in sentences like (3), in which ‘know’ denotes a relation between individuals rather 
than a relation between an individual, or individuals, and a proposition. 
 
(3)   Tony Blair knows George W. Bush. 
 
It is worth bringing up a small point of clarification regarding tense and context sensitivity. It 
is clear that different utterances of (2) may differ in truth value if uttered at different times. 
For instance, (2) would be false as uttered prior to Bush becoming President. However, this 
should not be taken as vindicating the contextualist claim that ‘know’ is context sensitive, and 
throughout the thesis I will ignore any context sensitivity due to the tense of the verb ‘know’, 
or indeed any other context sensitivity due to tense.9 We may therefore follow Stanley in 
taking contextualism to require ‘know’ to be ‘context-sensitive in a distinctly epistemological 
way’ (2005, p. 16). 
 
2.2 
                                                
Fleshing Out Contextualism 
Having thus stated the contextualist position, it should be noted that there are different ways 
of fleshing it out. While I do not want to focus on different ways of developing and 
implementing contextualism in this thesis, I still think it is a good idea to give a brief outline 
 
8 At least I will assume throughout the discussion that ‘know’ denotes a relation between an individual (or 
individuals) and a proposition. 
9 To be more precise, we could treat an explicit knowledge ascription as having the form ‘S knows at t in w that 
p’, where S is the subject, p is a proposition, t is a time and w is a possible world (Williamson 2005, p. 214). In 
the following I will ignore the time-parameter and world-parameters and assume that these are fixed. 
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of some different directions that contextualists may take in developing their position, as 
fleshing out the contextualist position will make the following discussion easier to understand. 
 David Lewis (1996) develops his version of contextualism by appealing to a shift in 
the possibilities that the evidence possessed by a subject S must rule out in order for it to be 
true to say ‘S knows that p’. According to his version of contextualism ‘S knows that p’ is 
true if and only if S’s evidence eliminates every possibility in which p does not hold (Lewis 
1996, p. 551). However, the domain of the quantifier is restricted, meaning that some 
possibilities are left outside the domain and can be ignored. Which possibilities the subject’s 
evidence must rule out, and which can be ignored, depends on the context. In certain contexts 
it might be necessary to rule out the possibility of being a brain in a vat, while in most 
everyday contexts this is not required because that possibility is being properly ignored. This 
is also the framework originally suggested by Stewart Cohen (1988). However, according to a 
later version of Cohen’s position he defends a view according to which justification is 
required for knowledge and what shifts is ‘how justified a belief must be in order to be 
justified simpliciter’ (1999, p. 60). DeRose (1995) on the other hand prefers to talk about a 
shift in the epistemic standards associated with ‘know’. Sometimes the contextually 
determined standards for knowledge are demanding, requiring the subject to be in a strong 
epistemic position. In other contexts, a weaker epistemic position may be sufficient. 
Contextualist accounts may also differ with respect to which features of the context are 
viewed as relevant to the variation in the truth conditions of utterances of sentences 
containing ‘know’. Different versions of contextualism may place emphasize on different 
features such as the practical stakes involved or the attentions of the speaker. Lewis’ (1979; 
1996) account seems to focus on the latter while DeRose (1992, p. 916) prefers to stress the 
former. This does not mean that a contextualist is forced to choose between one or the other, 
only that this is an area in which contextualist accounts may differ, and it is worth 
emphasizing that though their perspectives are slightly different, both Lewis and DeRose 
appeal to both set of features. 
 Moreover, there is the question of how the context sensitivity of ‘know’ is to be 
implemented. A very straightforward suggestion is to treat ‘know’ as an indexical like ‘I’ or 
‘here’. According to this model, ‘know’ would denote different relations in different contexts. 
I will follow Stanley (2005, p. 48) in understanding Cohen, DeRose and Lewis as sharing the 
view that the alleged context sensitivity of ‘know’ is to be implemented by treating ‘know’ as 
an indexical. However, this is not only way of implementing the context sensitivity of ‘know’. 
Another way of implementing the context sensitivity of ‘know’ is to argue that there is a 
 8
hidden indexical associated with ‘know’ in the logical form of sentences containing ‘know’. 
For instance, Peter Ludlow (2005) has presented a version of contextualism according to 
which there is an implicit L-marked position for standards of knowledge associated with 
‘know’. He takes his view to be motivated by the fact that ‘know’ can take modifiers such as 
‘by scientific standards’ and ‘with some reliability’ as in (4). 
 
(4)   Stephen Hawking knows that there are black holes by scientific standards. 
 
Whether this is adequate evidence for postulating that there is an implicit L-marked position 
for standards of knowledge associated with ‘know’ is not a question that I will pursue at any 
great lengths. However, it is worth noting, as Stanley (2005, p. 70) points out, that modifiers 
such as ‘by scientific standards’ are not only used with respect to sentences containing ‘know’ 
or other epistemic terms, and that this suggests that we are dealing with a more general 
phenomenon. 
 It should be noted that according to the version of contextualism proposed by Lewis 
(1996), ‘know’ involves restricted quantification over possibilities. His version of 
contextualism therefore allows the context sensitivity of ‘know’ to be understood in terms of 
the context sensitivity of quantifiers with contextually restricted domains. This means that the 
details of how the context sensitivity of ‘know’ is ultimately implemented, depends on one’s 
views on how the context sensitivity of quantifiers is to be implemented. 
 For the purpose of this thesis I propose mostly to gloss over the differences between 
different approaches to contextualism. In the following I will focus on contextualism as the 
view that ‘know’ is context sensitive as defined by (CS') and (CS'') rather than the different 
ways of developing and implementing that view. Moreover, I assume that the discussion 
which follows is relevant for different versions of contextualism. However, there are points in 
the following discussion where what one has to say about the more detailed workings of the 
alleged context sensitivity of ‘know’ becomes more important, and I will do my best to point 
them out. 
 
2.3 Alternatives to Contextualism 1: Classical and Subject-
Sensitive Invariantism 
So far, I have presented contextualism as the view that the expression ‘know’ is context 
sensitive. My present concern is to briefly sketch some of the alternative positions in the 
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debate about contextualism. This is in order to place contextualism in the theoretical 
landscape, and to help clarifying further what the contextualist position amounts to. 
One alternative to contextualism is the view which is often referred to as 
‘invariantism’. The invariantists deny that ‘know’ is context sensitive. According to the 
invariantist account, the contribution of the expression ‘know’ to the proposition expressed by 
an utterance of a sentence which contains it does not depend on the context. Consequently, 
assuming that there are no other context sensitive features of the sentence in question, 
different utterances of a sentence containing ‘know’ express the same proposition. It is normal 
to make a distinction between sceptical invariantism on the one hand, and moderate or non-
sceptical invariantism on the other. According to the sceptical invariantists, the truth 
conditions of knowledge-ascriptions are such that few, if any, of our ordinary knowledge 
ascriptions are true. The non-sceptical invariantists on the other hand, maintain that many of 
our knowledge ascriptions are true. This is not an attempt to provide a precise definition of 
sceptical and non-sceptical invariantism, but it is all that is needed for the present purpose. 
Most of the invariantist accounts that will be discussed in this thesis are versions of non-
sceptical invariantism, but I will not put a lot of emphasis on this distinction. 
Furthermore, there is a position which has emerged and attracted a lot of attention in 
recent years. This position is often called ‘subject-sensitive invariantism’ (just ‘sensitive 
invariantism’ in the following) and is distinguished from classical or insensitive invariantism. 
A prominent defender of this view is Jason Stanley (2005). John Hawthorne (2004, ch. 4) has 
also presented a version of this view, but while his treatment is largely positive, he does not 
explicitly endorse it.10 Everyone in the debate can agree that whether a subject knows a given 
proposition depends on certain features of the situation of the subject. Examples of relevant 
features of the subject’s situation may include, among other things, whether the subject 
believes the proposition in question and whether she possesses good evidence for it.11 The 
sensitive invariantist offers a special account in that they permit features of the subject’s 
situation which are not traditionally seen as epistemically relevant to play a role in 
determining whether the subject knows the proposition in question. Typically, this includes, 
but need not be restricted to, the practical concerns and interests of the subject (i.e. what is at 
stake for the subject). Timothy Williamson states the matter accordingly, ‘For them [the 
                                                 
10 It should be noted that neither Hawthorne nor Stanley use the term ’subject-sensitive invariantism’. Hawthorne 
(2004) uses the term ‘sensitive moderate invariantism’ and Stanley (2005) refers to his view as ‘interest-relative 
invariantism’. The name, ‘subject-sensitive invariantism’ is nevertheless quite common in the literature on the 
subject, and is used among others by DeRose (2004b; 2005). 
11 These examples are not meant to be uncontroversial. Lewis (1996, p. 556) for instance, wants to allow for 
cases of knowledge without belief. 
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sensitive invariantists], what epistemic standard the subject must meet in order to know is 
sensitive to non-epistemic features of the subject’s circumstances’ (2005, p. 217).12
Thus the features of the situation of the subject which the sensitive invariantists 
emphasize are similar to the features of the context which affect a shift in truth conditions 
according to the contextualist view. However, it is important to stress the difference between 
these positions. It is the context of utterance, the context in which the utterance is made, 
which is important according to contextualism. The sensitive invariantist account on the other 
hand, concerns the situation of the subject to whom knowledge is ascribed or denied. 
Consequently, they make somewhat different predictions about cases in which the context 
which the subject occupies does not coincide with the context of utterance. That is cases in 
which the speaker and the subject are not the same person. 
Stanley further stresses the extent to which the two positions differ in that 
contextualism is a semantic thesis while sensitive invariantism is not. ‘In contrast with 
contextualism, the advocate of IRI [interest-relative invariantism] has no semantic burden to 
discharge. IRI is not a semantic thesis at all; it is rather a metaphysical thesis about the nature 
of the knowledge relation’ (Stanley 2005, p. 120). It may be argued that Stanley overplays 
this distinction. Sensitive invariantism is not neutral on the truth conditions of utterances of 
sentences containing ‘know’ because it allows the practical situation of the subject to play a 
role in determining whether an ascription of knowledge is true. Still, sensitive invariantism 
differs from contextualism in not positing the semantic phenomenon of context sensitivity. All 
the same, contextualism and sensitive invariantism are motivated by a similar sort of cases. 
As a result, sensitive invariantism makes the task of providing evidence for contextualism 
somewhat more complicated. 
 
2.4 
                                                
Alternatives to Contextualism 2: Relativism 
Another recently proposed alternative to contextualism is relativism about truth. This is a 
position which has been developed and defended by John MacFarlane (2005a). On 
MacFarlane’s version of relativism the truth of a sentence or proposition depends on the 
context of assessment and not just the context of utterance (‘context of use’ in MacFarlane’s 
terminology). The context of assessment is the context in which a speech act is being assessed 
or evaluated as opposed to the context of utterance or use in which the sentence is uttered, and 
 
12 Williamson’s statement of the sensitive invariantist position turns on the non-epistemic features of the 
subject’s situation being understood as those features which are not truth-conducive, or at least those features 
which are traditionally taken to be non-epistemic features. See Stanley (2005, p. 2). 
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the relativists argue that the truth value of certain sentences or propositions can vary with the 
context of assessment. A sentence or proposition, the truth value of which varies with the 
context of assessment, is assessment sensitive. Relativism, in its weakest form, is the view 
that there is at least one assessment sensitive sentence, either in a natural language or in some 
conceivable language (2005a, p. 328). 
MacFarlane has not put forth relativism as a global view along the lines that all 
sentences are assessment sensitive, but has rather argued for a relativist treatment of certain 
classes of sentences. Most interestingly for the purpose of the present thesis, MacFarlane 
(2005b) has argued that a relativist semantics might be plausible in the case of ‘know’. This 
would amount to the expression ‘know’ contributing to the assessment sensitivity of sentences 
that contains it. Like contextualism, relativism about knowledge ascriptions is a semantic 
thesis about the expression ‘know’ and sentences that contains it. But while both 
contextualists and relativists about knowledge ascriptions hold that the truth value of 
sentences containing the expression ‘know’ depends on context, relativists about knowledge 
ascriptions differ from contextualists in taking the context of assessment rather than the 
context of utterance to be important. 
In a sense one could say that relativism is a somewhat more radical semantic thesis 
than contextualism. While there are uncontroversial examples of context sensitivity in the 
sense suggested by the contextualists, as was indeed illustrated by the expression ‘I’ in (1), 
there does not appear to be similarly uncontroversial examples of assessment sensitivity.13  
 
(1)  I am a philosophy student. 
 
While I will not discuss the relative merits of relativism versus contextualism in this thesis it 
is important to note that, like sensitive invariantism, relativism draws support from the same 
cases that allegedly provide evidence for contextualism, together with dissatisfaction with the 
contextualist position as well as the classical and sensitive invariantist positions (2005b). 
However, since relativism appears to be a more radical semantic thesis than contextualism, it 
is unclear whether the possibility of a relativist account of the cases that will be the focus of 
this thesis in itself undermines the evidence for contextualism. Still, the discussion of these 
cases is not irrelevant for the prospects of a relativist treatment of ‘know’. On the one hand 
                                                 
13 A relativist treatment has also been suggested in the case of epistemic modals (Egan, Hawthorne and 
Weatherson 2005) and future contingents (MacFarlane 2003) to name two examples. However, a relativist 
treatment is far from uncontroversial in either case. 
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there is the possibility that a relativist position might be an alternative if the contextualist 
account is found to be inadequate. On the other hand it means that relativism relies on much 
of the same evidence as contextualism. Thus, if this evidence is undermined it would 
presumably undermine the case for a relativist treatment of knowledge ascriptions as well. 
 13
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3 The Cases 
 
 
In order to provide evidence for the thesis that ‘know’ is a context sensitive expression, 
contextualists appeal to intuitions about different utterances of sentences containing ‘know’. 
One might consider our intuitions concerning sceptical arguments as a possible source of 
evidence for contextualism. In contexts where we are considering sceptical scenarios we are 
apt to find utterances of knowledge-ascribing sentences to be false that we would judge to be 
true in most ordinary contexts. The contextualists can account for this in terms of different 
utterances sentences containing ‘know’ having different truth conditions. However, there are 
certain limitations involved with this strategy for providing evidence for contextualism. First, 
there is the highly controversial nature of cases involving sceptical scenarios. Second, as 
DeRose (2005, p. 178) notes, our intuitions about these cases are not very strong or stable. 
Many would probably resist the intuition that we do not know that we have hands in contexts 
where sceptical possibilities are salient. Therefore, contextualists have presented other cases 
that they argue provide more reliable evidence that ‘know’ is context sensitive. My goal here 
is to present two such cases. In section 3.1 I present DeRose’s Bank Case and in section 3.2 I 
present Cohen’s Airport Case. 
 
3.1 Case 1: The Bank Case 
Since the nature of cases involving sceptical possibilities remain controversial, other cases 
which do not involve such radical sceptical possibilities, but focus on more mundane 
concerns, have been presented by contextualists seeking to provide support for the view that 
‘know’ is context sensitive. I will begin with a pair of cases originally presented by DeRose: 
 
Bank Case A. My wife and I are driving home on a Friday afternoon. We plan to stop at the bank on the 
way home to deposit our paychecks. But as we drive past the bank, we notice that the lines inside are 
very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons. Although we generally like to deposit our paychecks 
as soon as possible, it is not especially important in this case that they be deposited right away, so I 
suggest that we drive straight home and deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning. My wife says, 
“Maybe the bank won’t be open tomorrow. Lots of banks are closed on Saturdays.” I reply, “No, I know 
it’ll be open. I was just there two weeks ago on Saturday. It’s open until noon.” 
 
Bank Case B. My wife and I drive past the bank on a Friday afternoon, as in Case A, and notice the long 
lines. I again suggest that we deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning, explaining that I was at the 
bank on Saturday morning only two weeks ago and discovered that it was open until noon. But in this 
case, we have just written a very large and very important check. If our paychecks are not deposited into 
our checking account before Monday morning, the important check we wrote will bounce, leaving us in 
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a very bad situation. And, of course, the bank is not open Sunday. My wife reminds me of the facts. She 
then says, “Banks do change their hours. Do you know the bank will be open tomorrow?” Remaining as 
confident as I was before that the bank will be open then, still, I reply, “Well, no. I’d better go in and 
make sure.” (1992, p. 913) 
 
I will refer to this pair of cases collectively as ‘the Bank Case’. In Bank Case A, where 
relatively little is at stake and serious possibilities of error have not been raised, DeRose’s 
ascription of knowledge to himself appears to be true, assuming as DeRose (1992, p. 914) 
stipulates in his presentation, that the bank is in fact open Saturday. However, in Bank Case 
B, where the stakes are higher and DeRose’s wife has raised the possibility of the bank having 
changed its hours, the contextualists argue that we have equally strong intuitions that 
DeRose’s denial of knowledge is true. However, DeRose’s epistemic position with respect to 
the proposition that the bank will open is the same in the two cases. In both cases it is based 
on the evidence that he was at bank two weeks ago on a Saturday. Thus DeRose’s utterance of 
(5a) in Case A appears to be true, but so does the utterance of (5b) in Bank Case B. 
 
(5a) I know that it’ll be open. 
(5b) Well, no, I don’t know that it’ll be open.14 
 
Contextualism provides a way of removing the apparent contradiction by appealing to the 
alleged context sensitivity of ‘know’. If different utterances of (5a) and (5b) have different 
truth conditions due to the context sensitivity of the expression ‘know’ it is easy to see how 
both could be true.15 In the context described in Bank Case A the contribution of ‘know’ to 
the truth conditions of the utterance of (5a) is such that it comes out true. On the other hand, if 
DeRose were to utter (5a) in the context described in Bank Case B the contextualists would 
argue his utterance would be false. The contextualists can point to the higher stakes involved 
and the possibilities of error raised in Bank Case B as affecting a shift in truth conditions, 
making (5b) come out true and (5a) come out false. As a result of this contextualism allows us 
to retain our intuitions that the utterances made by DeRose in both Bank Case A and B are 
true.16
                                                 
14 I have taken the liberty of slightly modifying the sentence from DeRose’s presentation of the case in order to 
make it more explicit. 
15 It is of course possible to have utterances of (5a) and (5b) that are both true because they take place in contexts 
with different speakers or at different times. However, this does not affect the present cases where the time and 
the speaker are fixed, and I therefore ignore this complication both in this case, and in the following cases. 
16 I do not mean to suggest that contextualism as the semantic thesis that ‘know’ is a context sensitive expression 
is committed to these being the correct truth values for the utterances of (5a) and (5b). The point is rather that 
contextualism is in a position to account for our intuitions concerning the truth values of DeRose’s utterances in 
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Though this version of the Bank Case seems to pose a problem for classical 
invariantists who are seemingly forced to reject our intuitions about the truth values of the 
utterances in either Bank Case A or B, it is worth noting that an important feature of this 
version of the Bank Case is that it is a first-person case. That is to say that the in this case the 
subject and the speaker are the same person. This is important in evaluating the effectiveness 
of this case as a means of providing evidence for contextualism because such first-person 
cases can be accommodated by sensitive invariantism as well as contextualism. The sensitive 
invariantists can argue that the higher stakes involved in Bank Case B prevent DeRose from 
knowing that the bank will be open Saturday while maintaining that the ascription of 
knowledge to him in Bank Case A is true. The upshot of this is that sensitive invariantism can 
deliver the same verdict as contextualism with respect to these cases, namely that DeRose’s 
utterance of (5a) in Bank Case A, and his utterance of (5b) in Bank Case B, are both true. 
 
3.2 
                                                                                                                                                        
Case 2: The Airport Case 
In response to sensitive invariantism being able to accommodate first-person cases such as the 
Bank Case, contextualists have attempted to come up with cases which are less easily 
accommodated by sensitive invariantism. Rather than giving a different version of the Bank 
Case, I turn to Stewart Cohen’s Airport Case.17 My main reason for doing this is that I want 
to avoid any unnecessary confusion as a result of mixing the first-person and third-person 
cases. 
 
Mary and John are at the L.A. airport contemplating taking a certain flight to New York. They want to 
know whether the flight has a layover in Chicago. They overhear someone ask a passenger Smith if he 
knows whether the flight stops in Chicago. Smith looks at the flight itinerary he got from the travel 
agent and responds, “Yes I know – it does stop in Chicago.” It turns out that Mary and John have a very 
important business contact they have to make at the Chicago airport. Mary says, “How reliable is that 
itinerary? It could contain a misprint. They could have changed the schedule at the last minute.” Mary 
and John agree that Smith doesn’t really know that the plane will stop in Chicago. They decide to check 
with the airline agent. (Cohen 1999, p. 58) 
 
The Airport Case is very similar to the Bank Case. In both cases the alleged shift in truth 
conditions is tied to the practical stakes involved and the possibilities of error that are salient. 
When Smith makes an utterance of (6a) it comes out true, assuming again that the plane stops 
Bank Case A and B, and I will confine my discussion to a version of contextualism which seeks to accommodate 
these intuitions. 
17 For a third-person version of the Bank Case presented with the purpose of providing evidence against sensitive 
invariantism see DeRose (2005, p. 184) as well as Stanley (2005, p. 3-6). 
 17
in Chicago, since the practical stakes are quite low in his context and there are no serious and 
salient error possibilities. 
 
(6a) Yes I know – it does stop in Chicago. 
 
Though Mary and John has the same evidence as Smith in the itinerary, more is at stake for 
them and they are considering the possibility that the itinerary contains a misprint or that the 
schedule has been changed. Consequently, the contextualists can accommodate the intuition 
that if either Mary or John were utter (6b) their utterance would seem to be true, by appealing 
to a shift in truth conditions due to the context sensitivity of ‘know’ similar to the one 
described as taking place in the Bank Case. 
 
(6b) Smith doesn’t know that the plane will stop in Chicago. 
 
On the other hand it is less clear how this case can be accommodated by sensitive 
invariantism. Since it is the situation of the subject rather than the context of the speaker (i.e. 
the context of utterance) which is important according to sensitive invariantism, it is unclear 
why Mary and John’s denial of knowledge to Smith should come out true at the same time as 
Smith’s self-ascription of knowledge appears to be true. Even though much is at stake for 
Mary and John, little is at stake for Smith, and according to sensitive invariantism it is his 
practical concerns that are important for the purpose of determining whether (6b) is true. As a 
result, the Airport Case appears to pose problems both for classical and sensitive 
invariantism.18
                                                 
18 One should be careful about ruling out the possibility that there are strategies for accommodating third-person 
cases such as the Airport Case that are available to proponents of sensitive invariantism, which do not extend as 
far as giving classical invariantists an account of the original Bank Case. Such strategies are discussed by both 
Hawthorne (2004, ch. 4) and Stanley (2005, p. 98-104), but I will not discuss them here as my concern is not 
with sensitive invariantism, but with contextualism. 
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4 Expanding the Range of the Data 
 
 
The empirical question of whether the contextualists are correct in their claims about what 
intuitions competent language users have about the Bank Case and the Airport Case is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. Still, I will raise a number of complicating factors and issues with 
respect to the data presented by the contextualists and this is my main goal in this section. In 
section 4.1 I look at more data about the our use of ‘know’ in order to illustrate that there is 
more to our linguistic practices involving ‘know’ than what is revealed by just focusing on the 
Bank Case and the Airport Case. I then turn to a different sort of cases in section 4.2. These 
cases resemble the original cases, except that the conversational participants are ignorant of 
the high stakes involved. Such cases have been thought to present a problem for 
contextualism and I will discuss whether and how contextualists can accommodate them. 
Section 4.3 deals with the worry that the cases presented in section 3.1 and 3.2 are not 
psychologically realistic because they ignore the effect of the more pressing practical 
concerns on the confidence of the conversational participants, and that they therefore fail to 
provide secure evidence for contextualism. 
 
4.1 
                                                
More Data about Our Use of ‘Know’19 
In presenting their cases, contextualists tend to focus on a limited set of features of our 
linguistic practices involving ‘know’. The main focus of contextualists is typically with 
straightforward ascriptions like (5a) and denials like (5b). 
 
(5a) I know that it’ll be open. 
(5b) Well, no, I don’t know that it’ll be open. 
 
However, I think it is useful to look beyond straightforward sentences like these when 
examining the evidence for contextualism. My goal in this section is fairly modest insofar as I 
will only be presenting a very limited range of examples, and the examples are also fairly 
simple. Moreover, the primary intention is neither to strengthen, nor to undermine, the case 
for contextualism. Rather, I hope that this will serve to bring out some of the complexities 
 
19 Thanks to John Hawthorne for very useful suggestions and discussion concerning the examples in this section. 
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involved in our linguistic practices involving ‘know’ that might be ignored if one focuses 
solely on the cases presented by Cohen and DeRose. 
Taking the Bank Case as a starting point, and focusing on Bank Case B where the 
practical concerns are more pressing, I think it is interesting to note that there are other 
sentences than (5a) and (5b) that it would be plausible to think of as uttered by DeRose given 
his situation. For instance, consider (7a) as uttered by DeRose in the context described in 
Bank Case B. 
 
(7a) I think I know that it’ll be open, but I’d better go in and make sure. 
 
There does not appear to be anything obviously wrong with uttering (7a) in a context like the 
one described in Bank Case B, and though intuitions about may the truth value of (7a) may 
differ, it seems clearly better than (5a). But (7a) is not the only alternative to (5b) in the 
conversation in Bank Case B. For instance we may also consider (7b) as uttered by DeRose in 
Bank Case B. 
 
(7b) I think it’ll be open, but I’d better go in and make sure. 
 
In the case of (7b) he subject avoids using ‘know’ altogether, but it may still be acceptable 
given that the main question DeRose and his wife are concerning with is whether they should 
deposit their paycheques right away or whether they can wait until Saturday. 
Furthermore, an interesting type of case is provided by hedged sentences. For instance, 
we may follow Stanley (2005, p. 37 n. 3) in treating ‘really’ as it occurs in (7c) as a hedge. 
 
(7c) I don’t really know that it’ll be open. 
 
According to Paul Kay (1997, p. 134) hedges such as ‘technically’, ‘loosely speaking’, and in 
this case ‘really’, are typically used to make comments on the utterances or sentences in 
which they occur.20 Applying this to the case of ‘know’, Stanley comments that ‘in so using 
‘really’, one concedes the infelicity of asserting that one knows the proposition in question. 
Note that this is consistent with it being perfectly true throughout that one knows that 
proposition’ (2005, p. 37 n. 3). According to this treatment of ‘really’ as it occurs in sentences 
                                                 
20 Kay (1997) does not mention ‘really’ as his discussion focuses on the hedges ‘technically’ and ‘loosely 
speaking’, but note that ‘really’ is included in George Lakoff’s (1973, p. 472) list of English hedges. 
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like (7c), an utterance of the hedged sentence (7c) contains a comment on the 
inappropriateness of asserting the unhedged (5a). Again, (7c) seems to be acceptable given the 
circumstances in Bank Case B. 
It is worth noting that Cohen, given the treatment of ‘really’ adopted here, describe 
Mary and John as making a hedged claim when discussing Smith’s situation in the Airport 
Case. Cohen has them agreeing that ‘Smith doesn’t really know that the plane will stop in 
Chicago’ (1999, p. 58). It is difficult to say whether this has any effect on our intuitions about 
the cases, and more precisely, whether it makes us more likely to accept Mary and John’s 
claim as true. All the same, I will continue to treat Mary and John as uttering the unhedged 
sentence (6b). 
 
(6b) Smith doesn’t know that the plane will stop in Chicago. 
 
These considerations do not directly undermine the intuitions that contextualists claim that we 
have about (5a) and (5b). The point is rather to reveal some of the complexities involved in 
our use of sentences containing ‘know’, and given the alternatives, it is unclear what is the 
most natural candidate in the context described in Bank Case B. In his own description of 
Bank Case B, DeRose has himself making a strong claim by going as far as uttering (5b). 
However, it is not obvious that this is more, or even as natural, as the weaker alternatives (7a) 
to (7c). But unlike (5b), the alternatives (7a) to (7c) are consistent with (5a) being true as 
uttered in the context in Bank Case B. The contextualist can still maintain that our intuitions 
tell us that (5a) is false, and (5b) true, as uttered in Bank Case B, but I think that a theory 
which tries to draw support from our ordinary use of ‘know’ should take a broader range of 
data into consideration. 
 
4.2 Ignorant High Stakes 
There is another type of case that contextualists have tended not to focus on. In these cases 
there is a lot at stake, but the conversational participants are not aware of this. Stanley (2005) 
discusses such cases under the name ‘Ignorant High Stakes’. Using the original Bank Case as 
a starting point, one might consider a version of Bank Case B where there is still a lot at 
stakes, but where DeRose and his wife are unaware of the more pressing practical concerns 
and consequently the need to deposit their paycheques before Monday. In such a case DeRose 
might proceed to utter (5a), as he is not aware of the higher stakes. 
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 (5a) I know that it’ll be open. 
 
However, Stanley argues that given the higher stakes involved in the context described in 
Bank Case B, our intuition is that DeRose’s utterance is false despite him being ignorant of 
the increased costs of being wrong.21 Similarly in the Airport Case, where Mary or John 
might utter (8) because they are unaware of the importance of the plane stopping in Chicago. 
 
(8)   Smith knows that the plane will stop in Chicago. 
 
Again, (8) is intuitively false. But it is not obvious how cases like this fit into a plausible 
contextualist picture and whether they can be effectively used as a part of the contextualists’ 
argumentative strategy. Stanley (2005, p. 25) argues that since the conversational participants 
in this case are ignorant of the increased stakes, the contextualists would have to hold that the 
contribution of the expression ‘know’ to the truth conditions of the utterance of (5a) must be 
determined independently of the beliefs and intentions of the conversational participants. If 
the contribution of ‘know’ to truth conditions of the utterance of (5a) is to be determined by 
the intentions of the conversational participants, this would make the case in which the 
conversational participants are ignorant of the higher stakes similar in this respect to the 
original version of Bank Case A in which stakes are in fact low. We should then expect the 
same verdict with respect to the truth value of both DeRose’s utterance of (5a) in the original 
version of Bank Case A, and the utterance of (5a) in the Ignorant High Stakes case where 
there is a lot at stake, but the conversational participants are unaware of this. However, 
Stanley maintains that while the former utterance is intuitively true, the latter utterance is 
intuitively false. 
The problem that Stanley raises with respect to contextualism and these cases is that it 
is problematic for the contextualists to take the contribution of the expression ‘know’ to truth 
conditions to be fixed independently of the intentions of the conversational participants in this 
way. According to Stanley, this would be a departure from the standard view of how context 
sensitive expressions work. He claims that ‘the contextualist could accommodate Ignorant 
High Stakes, but only at the cost of advancing a rather dramatic claim about the potential 
                                                 
21 Stanley has a slightly more detailed presentation of a version of the Bank Case in which the participants are 
ignorant of the high stakes (2005, p. 5). 
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semantic effects of non-psychological facts about extralinguistic content’ (Stanley 2005, p. 
26). 
Stanley admits that there are context sensitive expressions, the contribution of which 
to the truth conditions of utterances of sentences that contain them is arguably determined 
independently of the intentions of the conversational participants, but argues that there are 
only a few plausible candidates. ‘But even those who accept the existence of such a class 
agree that the list is very small, perhaps restricted to ‘I’, ‘yesterday’, ‘tomorrow’, and a few 
other terms’ (Stanley 2005, p. 26 n. 3). Though Stanley does not pursue this further, there 
might be room for dispute even in the case of expressions like ‘today’, ‘tomorrow’ and 
‘yesterday’. John Perry (2001, p. 61) notes that the introduction of time zones and daylight 
savings time makes even these expressions a matter of debate if one views time zones and 
daylight savings time as political matters as opposed to viewing the reference of these 
expressions as being determined solely by the time and place of the utterance. 
To this we may add that the indexical ‘I’ is associated with a very simple rule which 
determines the referent in a particular context.22 An utterance of the expression ‘I’ refers to 
the speaker in the context of utterance. In the case of ‘know’ on the other hand, matters seem 
much more complex. The features of the context on which the exact contribution of ‘know’ to 
the truth conditions of utterances of sentences that contain it depends, such as the practical 
stakes involved in the context, seem less amenable to being captured by such a simple rule. 
This suggests that the case of ‘know’ is different from that of ‘I’ at least in some respects 
which might discourage someone who wants to model the alleged context sensitivity of 
‘know’ on the context sensitivity of ‘I’ with respect to the referent of the expression ‘I’ in a 
particular context being determined independently of the intentions of the conversational 
participants. 
Of course, this point should not be pushed too far. It rests on the assumption that the 
high degree of complexity involved in the case of ‘know’ makes an account in terms of the 
intentions of the conversational participants more natural, and this may not be obvious. 
Furthermore, these issues may be more complicated than Stanley allows in his argument 
against contextualism. There are other expressions that contextualists may point to in 
defending a view according to which the contribution of ‘know’ to the truth conditions of 
utterances of sentences that contain it is fixed independently of the intentions of the 
conversational participants. For instance, David Kaplan originally defended the view that the 
                                                 
22 We may think of this as related to what is called ‘character’ in David Kaplan’s (1989a) terminology. 
According to Kaplan, character is a function from contexts to contents. 
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referents of demonstratives, ‘that’ being a prime example thereof, are determined by a 
demonstration, that is, ‘typically, though not invariably, a (visual) presentation of a local 
object discriminated by a pointing’ (1989a, p. 490). The role of pointing gestures in 
determining the referent of a demonstrative is emphasized by Colin McGinn who suggests the 
following rule: ‘the referent of a token of ‘that F’ is to be the first F to intersect the line 
projected from the pointing finger, i.e. the F at the place indicated – on might almost say 
geometrically – by the accompanying gesture’ (1981, p. 163). Though Kaplan later changed 
his mind, arguing that the role he previously assigned to a demonstration in determining the 
referent should instead be played by a special sort of intention on the part of the speaker he 
called a ‘directing intention’ (Kaplan 1989b, p 582), this does not mean that his earlier view 
on the matter was altogether implausible. The fact that these matters are quite complex can be 
illustrated by considering an example, modified from Kaplan’s (1978, p. 335).23 Consider (9) 
as uttered by Kaplan while pointing at a picture on the wall behind him. 
 
(9)   That is a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. 
 
But whereas Kaplan thinks that the picture is a picture of Rudolf Carnap, the philosopher, the 
picture of Carnap has been replaced by a picture of Spiro Agnew, the Vice President of the 
United States under Richard Nixon. While Kaplan intends to refer to a picture of Carnap, he is 
pointing at a picture of Agnew. According to Kaplan, he is intuitively talking about a picture 
of Agnew and not a picture of Carnap. Kaplan originally took as this as suggesting that it is 
the demonstration, and not the intention, that determines the referent. It is debatable whether 
this provides any sort of conclusive evidence in favour of Kaplan’s original view, but at least 
it illustrates how complex these issues are. A view where the intentions of the conversational 
participants play a less significant role should therefore not be dismissed out of hand, at least 
not in the case of demonstrative expressions. With this in mind it is worth asking whether 
Stanley is warranted taking the contextualists to be ‘advancing a rather dramatic claim about 
the potential semantic effects of non-psychological facts about extralinguistic content’ (my 
emphasis) if they adopt the view that the contribution of ‘know’ to the truth conditions of 
utterances of sentences that contain it is determined independently of the intentions of the 
conversational participants. 
                                                 
23 Kaplan’s (1978) original example involved a new demonstrative, ‘Dthat’, that he introduced in the same paper. 
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 Matters become even more complex when considering the possibility that 
contextualists may adopt an intermediate position. If an intermediate position is available, 
contextualists may allow that the intentions of the conversational participant to play a role in 
determining the contribution of ‘know’ to the truth conditions of utterances of sentences that 
contain it, and still be able to accommodate the Ignorant High Stakes cases. According to such 
a view, the role of intentions is constrained by other features of the context such as the actual, 
as opposed to the perceived, practical stakes involved. This gives the intentions of the 
conversational participants some, but limited, control over the contribution of ‘know’ to the 
truth conditions of utterances of sentences that contain it, thus preventing the intentions of the 
conversational participants from determining truth conditions that are inappropriate given the 
practical stakes involved in that context. According to this view, utterances of (5a) would 
have the same, or at least similar, truth conditions in the Ignorant High Stakes version of Bank 
Case B and in the original version of Bank Case B. Consequently, (5a) would be false as 
uttered in both cases. I have only begun to sketch an outline of such a view. Whether it is 
ultimately a plausible view, and whether and how it can be worked out in more detail, are 
further questions that I will not pursue here. It is sufficient for present purposes to note that 
the Ignorant High Stakes cases do not force contextualists to adopt the stronger view that the 
intentions of the conversational participants do not play any role in determining the 
contribution of ‘know’ to the truth conditions of utterances of sentences that contain it. 
DeRose takes a rather cautious attitude towards cases in which the conversational 
participants are ignorant of the high stakes involved. He says, ‘In fact, I think that speakers 
are free to use standards even wildly inappropriate to the practical situation they face – for 
instance, to use low standards when they face an extremely high stakes situation in which it 
would be much wiser for them to employ much higher standards’ (DeRose 2005, pp.177-
178). On the one hand these remarks suggest that he does not take the contribution of ‘know’ 
to the truth conditions of utterances of sentences that contain it to be determined 
independently of the intentions of the conversational participants. However, DeRose (2005, p. 
178) goes on to warn that our intuitions about such cases might be distorted as a result of 
mistaking the impropriety of using inappropriate standards for the utterance being actually 
false. But there seems to be a danger associated with this sort of response to the Ignorant High 
Stakes cases, namely that similar considerations will undermine the evidence for 
contextualism provided by our intuitions about the cases that favour contextualism, like 
DeRose’s Bank Case 
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However, it should be noted that the Ignorant High Stakes version of Bank Case B 
differs from the original version in that the latter involves the intuition that DeRose’s 
utterance of (5b) is true and not just that his utterance of (5a) is false. 
 
(5b) Well, no, I don’t know that it’ll be open. 
 
It may be argued that this difference makes our intuitions about DeRose’s utterance in the 
original version of Bank Case B more reliable than our intuitions about his utterance in the 
Ignorant High Stakes version. This derives from DeRose’s (1999, p. 199; 2002, pp. 192-193; 
2005, pp. 174-175) general preference for relying on intuitions about the truth of utterances 
rather than intuitions about the falsity of utterances, as he takes the former to be more secure 
than the latter. But the intuitions appealed to with respect to the Ignorant High Stakes cases 
are intuitions about the falsity of utterance, rather than intuitions about truth as in the regular 
versions of the Bank Case and Airport Case. For instance, in Bank Case B, the contextualists 
argue that not only would an utterance of (5a) by DeRose be intuitively false, but also that 
DeRose’s utterance of (5b) is intuitively true. But as long as DeRose is ignorant of the higher 
stakes it would appear unnatural to have him utter (5b), making it difficult to appeal to 
intuitions about truth when it comes to the Ignorant High Stakes cases. I will return to the 
issue of this alleged asymmetry between intuitions about truth and intuitions about falsity in 
section 6.2 where I will undertake a more thorough discussion of this methodological 
assumption, and DeRose’s attempt to motivate it. For now, I will be content with noting that it 
is not clear that this distinction should be made to carry as much weight as DeRose wants it to 
carry. 
While I do not take these considerations to be conclusive with respect to how the 
Ignorant High Stakes cases fit into the contextualist story, I think that these considerations 
illustrate how general assumptions about the nature of context sensitivity in natural languages 
may impinge on the debate about the alleged context sensitivity of ‘know’, and potentially 
constrain how contextualism is defended and developed. More specifically, these issues raise 
some interesting questions about the extent to which the workings of the alleged context 
sensitivity of ‘know’ must be similar to the workings of other context sensitive expressions. If 
one is willing to accept that the workings of the context sensitivity of ‘know’ are different 
from the workings of most other context sensitive expressions, and that the case of ‘know’ is 
somehow special in this respect, one might find it less problematic to take the contribution of 
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‘know’ to the truth conditions of utterances of sentences that contain it to be determined 
independently of the beliefs and intentions of the conversational participants.24
 
4.3 
                                                
Are the Cases Psychologically Realistic? 
One matter which deserves some attention at this point is the worry that the Bank and Airport 
Cases are not psychologically realistic as presented by the contextualists. The issue is the 
stipulation, made explicit by DeRose in his presentation of the Bank Case, that the subject’s 
level of confidence remains the same when moving from a context where there is not much at 
stake to a context where the stakes are higher. But this stipulation may not be psychologically 
realistic. As Kent Bach remarks about the Bank Case, ‘It seems to me that unless he’s trying 
to placate his wife, his belief would have to be shaken somewhat’ (2005, p. 76). One way of 
formulating this worry considered, but ultimately rejected by Stanley (2005, pp. 6-7), is that 
the more pressing practical concern causes the subject’s degree of belief in the proposition in 
question to fall to a point bellow what is needed for knowledge, or perhaps that the loss of 
confidence somehow defeats the subject’s evidence. Applied to the first-person Bank Case 
this provides an account of the intuition that it is true for DeRose to deny knowledge to 
himself in Bank Case B. The higher practical stakes involved in the context described in Bank 
Case B compared to the context described in Bank Case A causes his confidence to be shaken, 
thus ensuring that it is no longer true to ascribe knowledge to him with respect to the 
proposition in question. 
But as Stanley is quick to point out, this account cannot be extended to third-person 
cases such as the Airport Case. In the Airport Case there is no reason to suppose that there is 
any change in the subject’s level of confidence, simply because Smith is not in a situation in 
which there are any particularly pressing practical concerns. While there is more at stake in 
Mary and John’s context there is no reason to think that this would undermine Smith’s 
confidence. Thus this way of formulating the worry would not undermine the effectiveness of 
the Airport Case as a means of providing evidence for contextualism. 
However, Bach (2005, pp. 76-80) has argued that there is a way of spelling out the 
initial worry that would apply to third-person cases as well as first-person cases, but which is 
not explicitly discussed by Stanley. Rather than focusing on the subject’s degree of belief, 
 
24 Indeed, one might take precisely the sort of Ignorant High Stakes cases under discussion to motivate a version 
of contextualism according to which the contribution of the expression ‘know’ to the truth conditions of 
utterances of sentences that contain it is determined independently of the beliefs and intentions of the 
conversational participants. 
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Bach proposes to start from the assumption that one must confidently believe the proposition 
that p in order to ascribe to someone else knowledge that p, and that one must have some 
doubts about p in order to deny knowledge that p to someone who is in a similar epistemic 
position as oneself. This starting point is based on the relatively uncontroversial further 
assumption that knowledge implies truth. As Bach argues, ‘In general, you can’t coherently 
assert that someone else knows that p if you are not confident that p and think that it still 
needs to be verified’ (2005, p. 77). 
Applied to the Airport Case this explains why Mary and John deny knowledge to 
Smith. This is because Smith is relying on the same evidence as Mary and John (i.e. the 
itinerary), and Mary and John are not confident that it has been firmly established that the 
flight has a layover in Chicago. According to Bach, the higher stakes and the more salient 
possibilities of error have the effect of raising the ascriber’s threshold for confidently 
believing. This threshold marks how strong reasons one needs in order to confidently believe 
the proposition in question. Sometimes this involves having more evidence than is required of 
the subject in order for it be true to ascribe knowledge to him or her. Bach argues that this is 
what happens in the Airport Case and that this offers a plausible account of our intuitions 
about Mary and John’s denial of knowledge to Smith. 
However it is worth noting that these considerations would not apply to Ignorant High 
Stakes cases considered in section 4.2. The account offered by Bach cannot account for the 
intuition that (5a) would be false as uttered in the context in the Ignorant High Stakes version 
of Bank Case B or the intuition that (8) would be false as uttered by Mary or John in their 
context in the Ignorant High Stakes version of the Airport Case. 
 
(5a) I know that it’ll be open. 
(8)   Smith knows that the plane will stop in Chicago. 
 
This is because the ascriber is ignorant of the higher stakes and thus there is no reason to 
suppose that the ascriber’s confidence is shaken and that his or her threshold for confidently 
believing is raised. This suggests that more than Bach’s account is needed in order to for us to 
properly account for our intuitions about the variation in our use of ‘know’ revealed by the 
various cases under discussion. But as the discussion in section 4.2 demonstrates, it is not 
clear whether and how these cases fit into a plausible contextualist picture of how the 
contribution of ‘know’ to the truth conditions of utterances of sentences that contain it is 
determined. Therefore it is also unclear whether the Ignorant High Stakes cases can be made 
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to fit into a contextualist argumentative strategy. If contextualists adopt the methodological 
assumption defended by DeRose that intuitions about truth are more reliable than intuitions 
about utterances, there would also be a methodological obstacle facing contextualists wanting 
to use the Ignorant High Stakes cases to alleviate the worry that their cases are not 
psychologically realistic. This makes the question about how the Ignorant High Stakes cases 
fit into a contextualist picture even more significant. 
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5 Contextualism and Context Shifting Arguments 
 
 
So far I have presented DeRose’s Bank Case and Cohen’s Airport Case along with some 
initial complications. In the present section I will focus on the argument that DeRose and 
Cohen rely on in taking our intuitions about these cases to provide evidence for 
contextualism. While I have already presented the Bank Case and the Airport Case along with 
the reasoning employed by the contextualists in arguing that these cases provide evidence for 
contextualism in section 3.1 and 3.2, my goal in the present section is to identify some of the 
assumptions behind their argument, and to look at how the argument for the context 
sensitivity of ‘know’ relates to some questions concerning context sensitivity in general. 
DeRose makes a confident claim about the extent to which cases such as the Bank 
Case provide evidence for the thesis that the expression ‘know’ is context sensitive: 
 
The best grounds for accepting contextualism concerning knowledge attributions come from how 
knowledge-attributing (and knowledge-denying) sentences are used in ordinary, non-philosophical talk 
[…] This type of basis in ordinary language provides not only the best grounds we have for accepting 
contextualism concerning knowledge attributions, but, I believe, is evidence of the very best type one 
can have for concluding that any piece of language is context sensitive. (2005, p. 172). 
 
If DeRose is correct then Cohen and DeRose’s argument for contextualism based on the cases 
presented in section 3.1 and 3.2 provides strong evidence that ‘know’ is a context sensitive 
expression. In my discussion of the argument that Cohen and DeRose rely on in taking our 
intuitions about the Bank Case and the Airport Case to provide evidence for the context 
sensitivity of ‘know’ I will focus on Cappelen and Lepore’s (2003; 2005b) discussion of what 
they refer to as ‘context shifting arguments’. If correct, these considerations might raise 
doubts about DeRose’s statement. 
A context shifting argument involves describing different utterances, which are 
imagined as taking place in different contexts, of a sentence containing a suspected context 
sensitive expression. If one has intuitions about these utterances having different truth 
conditions or truth values, or different things being said or expressed by these utterances, that 
is taken as showing that the expression is context sensitive, assuming that our intuitions 
cannot be attributed to ambiguity, ellipsis, vagueness or any other context sensitive features of 
the sentence in question such as tense or other context sensitive expressions. 
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This description of context shifting arguments fits very well with what is going on in 
the case of Cohen and DeRose’s argument for contextualism based on the Bank Case and the 
Airport Case. While Cohen and DeRose do not describe different utterances of the same 
sentence containing ‘know’, but rather pairs of sentences, the basic argument is similar. 
Cohen and DeRose appeal to intuitions about variations in the truth values of utterances of 
sentences containing ‘know’, and based on these intuitions they conclude that ‘know’ is a 
context sensitive expression. 
However, Cappelen and Lepore raise an important problem concerning how context 
shifting arguments are used. The problem is that the theorists employing context shifting 
arguments ignore the role of their own context, the context in which the context shifting 
argument is presented. ‘To not make the context of the thought experiment an essential 
variable of the experiment is like trying to measure the speed of objects around you while 
ignoring your own speed’ (Cappelen and Lepore 2005b, p. 10). 
Cappelen and Lepore distinguish between the storytelling context in which the context 
shifting argument is presented and the target context which is described as a part of presenting 
the context shifting argument. Based on this distinction they draw a further distinction 
between two different kinds of context shifting arguments depending on whether the 
suspected context sensitive expression is used or only mentioned in the storytelling context. 
On the one hand there are what they refer to as ‘Impoverished Context Shifting Arguments’. 
When presenting an Impoverished Context Shifting Argument, the suspected context sensitive 
expression is mentioned, but not used in the storytelling context. In this case the suspected 
context sensitive expression is only described as being used in the target context (Cappelen 
and Lepore 2005b, p. 107). It is the use of Impoverished Context Shifting Arguments that 
Cappelen and Lepore find problematic, because such context shifting arguments ignore the 
role of the storytelling context and only rely on intuitions about the use of the suspected 
context sensitive expression in the target context. Consequently, these Impoverished Context 
Shifting Arguments do not provide reliable evidence that an expression is context sensitive 
according to Cappelen and Lepore. 
On the other hand there are what they call ‘Real Context Shifting Arguments’. When 
giving a Real Context Shifting Arguments for a suspected context sensitive expression, the 
expression is both used and mentioned in the storytelling context. The suspected context 
sensitive expression is first used in the storytelling context, and is then mentioned in the 
storytelling context when it is described as being used in the target context (Cappelen and 
Lepore 2005, p. 107). According to Cappelen and Lepore, Real Context Shifting Arguments 
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are reliable indicators of context sensitivity, and if we can provide a Real Context Shifting 
Argument for a suspected context sensitive expression, that is strong evidence for the context 
sensitivity of the expression in question. 
To illustrate how a Real Context Shifting Argument for the indexical expression ‘I’ 
might look like, consider (10). 
 
(10) I am a philosophy student, but when my friend Malthe who studies medicine
 and not philosophy says, ‘I am a philosophy student’ he says something false. 
 
This seems to be a good candidate for a Real Context Shifting Argument. The expression ‘I’ 
is used in the storytelling context as well as mentioned in describing its use in the target 
context. Furthermore, and crucially, (10) is intuitively true, and there does not something to 
be anything strange about it. 
Applying this distinction between Real and Impoverished Context Shifting Arguments 
to Cohen and DeRose’s arguments for contextualism, it is clear that they are offering an 
Impoverished Context Shifting Argument. The expression ‘know’ as it occurs in DeRose’s 
description of the Bank Case and Cohen’s description of the Airport Case is described as 
being used in the target context (i.e. the context described in the Bank Case or the context 
described in the Airport Case), but is only mentioned in the storytelling context. This is 
evident from the fact that the expression ‘know’ only occurs between quotation marks.25
 Furthermore, a Real Context Shifting Argument does not appear to be forthcoming in 
the case of ‘know’ as the following attempt by Cappelen and Lepore to construct such an 
argument illustrates: 
 
Known Rupert. Right now, I’m doing philosophy and thinking about Rupert. Rupert, however, is not 
now doing philosophy. Instead, he’s home making tea. Rupert doesn’t know he is 30 years old. For 
Rupert to know he is 30 years old, he has to rule out the possibility that he is a brain in a vat. Rupert, 
however, is unaware of (or not thinking about) this possibility. And so he’s ignoring a possibility that 
must be ruled out in order for anyone to know anything at all. Still, when Rupert utters in the comfort of 
                                                 
25 Strictly speaking, as Cappelen and Lepore are aware, Cohen’s presentation of the Airport Case raises some 
questions with regards to these issues. In fact, the expression ‘know’ appears to be used in the storytelling 
context as it occurs outside quotation marks. For instance, Cohen writes, ‘Mary and John agree that Smith 
doesn’t really know that the plane will stop in Chicago’ (1999, p. 58). But as Cappelen and Lepore (2005b, p. 
120-121) point out it is difficult of making sense of Cohen’s presentation of the Airport Case if ‘know’ is to be 
understood as taking on the value it is has in the storytelling context as this would have Mary and John agreeing 
and disagreeing with utterances in the storytelling context. In fact, Cohen (1999, p. 65) admits that he prefers to 
speak in the object language rather than use the appropriate metalinguistic locutions, due to stylistic 
considerations, but emphasizes that one should not be misled by this. Therefore I think it is safe to conclude that 
Cohen is offering an Impoverished Context Shifting Argument for ‘know’. 
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his home, ‘I know I am 30 years old’ what he says is true, because he’s ignoring this possibility, even 
though this possibility has to be considered for Rupert to know anything at all. (2005b, p. 110) 
 
In this case the expression ‘know’ is used in the storytelling context in addition to being 
mentioned in describing its use in the target context, (i.e. Rupert’s context). However, this 
does not appear to be a plausible candidate for a real context shifting argument simply 
because the story appears to be intuitively false. Note the difference between this story and 
(10) in this respect. Thus it appears that contextualists must rely on impoverished context 
shifting arguments when attempting to provide evidence for the thesis that ‘know’ is a context 
sensitive expression. 
Cappelen and Lepore take the central, and according to their view, faulty, assumption 
behind the use of Impoverished Context Shifting Arguments to be what they refer to as ‘The 
Mistaken Assumption’. The Mistaken Assumption, as formulated by Cappelen and Lepore, 
states that26
 
A theory of semantic content is adequate just in case it accounts for all or most of the intuitions speakers 
have about speech act content, i.e., intuitions about what speakers say, assert, claim, and state by 
uttering sentences. (2005b, p. 53) 
 
I have presented the argument for contextualism in terms of intuitions about the truth values, 
and the truth conditions, of utterances of sentences containing ‘know’. While Cappelen and 
Lepore formulate The Mistaken Assumption in terms of intuitions about what speakers say, 
assert, claim, and state, it can be extended to intuitions about the truth values and truth 
conditions of utterances as well. Put in this terminology, though somewhat weaker than in the 
original statement, the assumption underlying the use of Impoverished Context Shifting 
Arguments is that if such arguments trigger intuitions about the truth conditions of an 
utterance of a sentence in English, then these are semantically significant intuitions, intuitions 
that a semantic theory of English must accommodate when assigning truth conditions to the 
utterance in question. 
The following discussion (section 6) will focus on a more specific alternative to a 
semantic treatment of our intuitions concerning the Bank Case and the Airport Case. 
However, Cappelen and Lepore’s claim that The Mistaken Assumption is a critical 
assumption behind the use of Impoverished Context Shifting Arguments demonstrates how 
                                                 
26 Cappelen and Lepore (2005b, p. 53-54) entertain two different formulations of The Mistaken Assumption, but 
I only consider the weaker, less precise, formulation here. 
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the assumption that such intuitions reveal a variation in the truth conditions of utterances of 
sentences containing ‘know’ may be challenged on a more general level. 
One might object that contextualists do not need to accept The Mistaken Assumption 
as a general assumption, but only need to argue that it is the sort of intuitions that they appeal 
to in giving a context shifting argument for ‘know’ that are semantically significant. However, 
this raises the problem of drawing a principled distinction between the sort of intuitions about 
what speakers say, assert, etc. that a semantic theory must account for, and the sort of 
intuitions that are irrelevant when doing semantics. Cappelen and Lepore’s distinction 
between Real and Impoverished Context Shifting Arguments can be seen as one way of doing 
this. But it does not appear to be any obvious way of doing this for contextualists who want to 
continue relying on Impoverished Context Shifting Arguments. In light of this it seems 
reasonable to attribute a commitment to some version of The Mistaken Assumption to 
contextualists relying on an Impoverished Context Shifting Argument for ‘know’. 
Cappelen and Lepore are not alone in being suspicious of assumptions like The 
Mistaken Assumption. For instance, Nathan Salmon (1991) has argued that when a speaker 
utters a declarative sentence which semantically expresses the proposition that p, the speaker 
typically also asserts that p. But it does not follow that when a speaker asserts that p, that p is 
the proposition semantically expressed by the utterance of the sentence in question. Inferring 
semantic content from asserted content in this way would involve committing a fallacy 
Salmon labels ‘The Pragmatic Fallacy’. But whereas Cappelen and Lepore are concerned with 
question concerning context sensitivity, Salmon arrives at his conclusion based on 
considerations involving such issues as Keith Donnellan’s (1966) distinction between 
attributive and referential uses of definite descriptions, and cases involving incomplete 
definite descriptions. 
On the other hand, it is not only in the case of ‘know’ that theorists rely on The 
Mistaken Assumption and Impoverished Context Shifting Arguments in order to support their 
claims about context sensitivity. Contextualists can therefore appeal to how Impoverished 
Context Shifting Arguments are used to provide evidence that other expressions are context 
sensitive. As DeRose points out, ‘Moving to context sensitivity, such facts about ordinary 
usage also provide us with our primary, most important and best evidence that clearly context 
sensitive terms like ‘tall’ are context sensitive in the way that we take them to be’ (2005, p. 
191). DeRose is calling attention to the fact that considerations which are similar to those 
appealed to by contextualists in the case of ‘know’ also provide evidence that gradable 
adjectives such as ‘tall’, ‘rich’ and ‘flat’ are context sensitive. Since the view that gradable 
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adjectives are context sensitive is almost universally accepted, this would seem to strengthen 
the contextualists’ case in arguing that ‘know’ is context sensitive. 
But while it is widely held that gradable adjectives are context sensitive, it is worth 
noting that Cappelen and Lepore (2005a; 2005b) reject this precisely on the grounds that the 
context sensitivity of gradable adjectives is only supported by Impoverished Context Shifting 
Arguments.27 Furthermore, they argue that Impoverished Context Shifting Arguments can in 
principle be provided for any expression. Their argument involves taking a wide range of 
different sentences and constructing context shifting arguments involving these sentences 
(Cappelen and Lepore 2005b, ch. 3). If Cappelen and Lepore’s argument is sound, then a 
contextualist who relies on an Impoverished Context Shifting Argument for ‘know’ must 
accept that similar arguments can be used to show that every expression is context sensitive. 
I do not presume to be able to settle questions concerning how large the set of context 
sensitive expressions in English is within the scope of this thesis, nor is it my intention to 
tackle these issues. Nevertheless I think it is important to note that the question about the 
extent to which cases such as the Bank Case and the Airport Case provide evidence that 
‘know’ is context sensitive, the main question in this thesis, depend on these more general 
issues. The arguments in this section suggest a picture according to which contextualism goes 
together with there being many context sensitive expressions. This is illustrated both by 
Cappelen and Lepore’s claim that similar arguments can be constructed in the case of any 
expression, and to a lesser extent by DeRose’s appeal to how arguments similar to those used 
by contextualists to argue that ‘know’ is context sensitive are used to support the view that 
gradable adjectives are context sensitive. Whether such a picture is plausible as compared to 
one in which the range of context sensitive expressions is more limited, possibly excluding 
‘know’, is a question I will not attempt to answer here. 
                                                 
27 I am ignoring the possibility that the context sensitivity of gradable adjectives can be supported by appeal to 
what Cappelen and Lepore (2005b) refer to as ‘Incompleteness Arguments’. 
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An Alternative to a Semantic Treatment of the Cases28 6 
 
 
Perhaps the most straightforward alternative to a semantic treatment of our intuitions about 
the Bank Case and the Airport Case is a treatment in terms of warranted assertability.29 
Warranted assertability is a matter of whether it would be warranted or appropriate to assert a 
given sentence in a given context.30 Whereas contextualists argue that our intuitions about the 
Bank Case and the Airport Case track the truth conditions of the utterances in question, it may 
be objected that our intuitions might instead be tracking the conditions under which it would 
be warranted or appropriate to assert these sentences. According to this objection, 
contextualists are simply mistaken in thinking that our intuitions must concern the former 
rather than the latter. If this is correct, then the evidence for contextualism would be 
undermined because there would be no need to treat our intuitions about the Bank Case and 
the Airport Case as revealing a variation in the truth conditions of different utterances of 
sentences containing ‘know’. DeRose goes as far as claiming that ‘The chief bugaboo of 
contextualism has been the concern that the contextualist is mistaking a variability in the 
conditions of warranted assertibility of knowledge attributions for a variability in their truth 
conditions’ (2002, p. 167). The attempts by DeRose (1999; 2002) to alleviate this worry for 
contextualism will be central to the following discussion. 
 My goal in this section is to show that it is harder for contextualists to rule out the 
possibility that they are mistaking a variation in warranted assertability conditions for a 
variation in truth conditions than it initially appears to be. I begin 6.1 by presenting an initial 
characterization of what DeRose calls a ‘warranted assertability manœuvre’ (‘WAM’ for 
short) in defence of the view that ‘know’ is not context sensitive. I then present a worry raised 
by DeRose (1999; 2002) that such WAMs could too easily be used to explain away any 
putative counterexample to a semantic theory, regardless of how implausible the theory 
appears to be. DeRose concludes that we must distinguish plausible candidates for a WAM 
from implausible candidates and introduces three criteria for a plausible candidate for a WAM 
                                                 
28 Some of the material in this section is taken from a paper I wrote in the spring of 2006 as a part of fulfilling 
the requirements of the class FIL4471 Referanse, kontekst og talehandling II. 
29 This is not to say that a treatment in terms of warranted assertability is the only alternative to a semantic 
treatment. Williamson (2005) has argued that our intuitions about cases such as the Bank Case and the Airport 
Case may be the result of bias caused by psychological salience effects. See also the discussion of Bach’s (2005) 
views in section 4.3. 
30 ‘Warrant’ is used here in a broad sense. Having warrant is not just a matter of having epistemic warrant. 
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designed to accomplish this. These criteria will be the focus of section 6.2. In section 6.3 I 
examine attempts to provide a WAM in defence of invariantism that satisfies DeRose’s 
criteria. In section 6.4 I examine the issue of whether considerations involving cancellability 
might supplement DeRose’s criteria in the contextualist attempt to rule out such a WAM. 
Based on the discussion in sections 6.2 to 6.4 I argue in section 6.5 that DeRose’s criteria are 
inadequate in so far as the contextualists’ argumentative aims are concerned. In order to 
underwrite this point, and to illustrate the difficulty of providing a plausible set of criteria that 
satisfies the contextualists’ argumentative purposes, I provide a WAM that satisfies these 
criteria in defence of the view that ‘tall’ is not context sensitive. I then argue in section 6.6 
that competent language users must be sensitive to the semantic workings of their own 
language in order for cases such as the Bank Case and Airport Case to provide evidence for 
contextualism. At the end of section 6 I include an appendix (6.7) on an attempt on the part of 
DeRose (2002) to use considerations about warranted assertability to provide a positive 
argument for contextualism. 
 
6.1 
                                                
Contextualism and Warranted Assertability 
According to DeRose (2002, p. 171), this objection to contextualism amounts to a WAM in 
defence of invariantism. Following DeRose’s account, a WAM involves explaining intuitions 
about the truth and falsity of utterances in terms of warranted assertability. The idea behind 
the use of a WAM is that asserting a sentence may fail to be warranted even though the 
utterance of the sentence is true, and that there may be contexts in which it is warranted to 
assert something false. This idea is combined with the further assumption that we are liable to 
confuse warranted assertability for truth, at least under certain circumstances. 
An example might illustrate how truth and warranted assertability may fail to 
converge.31 Suppose someone wants to know whether Phil is a good philosophy student. 
Moreover, assume that that Phil is indeed an excellent and very talented philosophy student in 
addition to being very punctual and having beautiful handwriting, and that the person asked 
knows all of this. However, if the person asked were to answer by uttering (11), even if it is in 
fact true, that would not be warranted because it would convey, by means of an implicature, 
that Phil is not a very good philosophy student, at least on the assumption that punctuality and 
good handwriting are not the most important qualities to look for in a good philosophy 
student. 
 
31 I am using a modified version of one of Paul Grice’s (1991a, p. 31) examples of conversational implicature. 
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 (11) Phil is always on time and has beautiful handwriting. 
 
In this case we are probably not very likely to confuse the fact that one cannot warrantedly 
assert (11) for an utterance of (11) being false, but it is a clear example of a sentence which 
cannot be warrantedly asserted in a certain context, despite the sentence being true as uttered 
in that context. 
Starting with how this may be applied to the Bank Case, a WAM may target the 
intuitions about the utterances in either Bank Case A or Bank Case B. This involves either 
explaining the truth of (5a), and the corresponding falsity of (5b), in Bank Case A as a result 
of mistaking the warranted assertability of (5a) for the utterance being true, or taking the truth 
of (5b), and the corresponding falsity of (5a), in Bank Case B to be explained by DeRose 
being warranted in asserting (5b) in that context. 
 
(5a) I know that it’ll be open. 
(5b) Well, no, I don’t know that it’ll be open. 
 
Similarly with respect to the Airport Case, it may either be that we are mistaking the 
warranted assertability of (6a) for Smith’s utterance being true, or that we are making a 
similar mistake in the case of Mary or John uttering (6b). 
 
(6a) Yes I know – it does stop in Chicago. 
(6b) Smith doesn’t know that the plane will stop in Chicago. 
 
For the moment it is sufficient to note the possibility of confusing a variation in warranted 
assertability conditions for a variation in truth conditions, leaving it an open question whether 
it is our intuitions about (5a) and (6a) or the intuitions about (5b) and (6b) that are confused in 
this way. 
This characterization also leaves the details of how the WAM is executed open. 
However, it is worth nothing that DeRose focuses on WAMs involving an appeal to 
implicatures, at least insofar as this is what he focuses on in his examples. Therefore, I will 
make WAMs involving implicatures the focus of the discussion here as well. With this in 
mind, it seems natural to put the issue more broadly in terms of whether our intuitions about 
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the cases admit of a post-semantic, pragmatic treatment, rather than the semantic treatment 
defended by the contextualists. 
DeRose objects against the use of a WAM in defence of invariantism on the grounds 
that such a strategy would not only provide invariantism with a defence against the cases 
presented by the contextualists, but could be used in defence of any semantic theory facing 
putative counterexamples. Stanley echoes DeRose’s concern. He claims that ‘By undermining 
the data for semantic theory, this kind of strategy threatens to undermine the semantic project’ 
(Stanley 2005, p. 14). The worry raised by DeRose and Stanley is that unrestricted use of 
WAMs threatens to undermine the evidence for semantic theories in general. If it can always 
be claimed that our intuitions track warranted assertability conditions rather than truth 
conditions we would have no reliable way of providing evidence for semantic theories. 
DeRose (2002, p. 174) provides several examples which illustrate the general point. We can 
for instance imagine a semantic theory of the expression ‘is a bachelor’ that entails that 
utterances of sentences like (12) and (13) have the same truth conditions. 
 
(12) Bill is a bachelor. 
(13) Bill is a man. 
 
According to this theory it is not a part of the truth conditions of (12) that Bill must be 
unmarried. A theory which omits this part of the truth conditions of (12), and entails that (12) 
is true even if Bill is married just as long as Bill is a man, does not appear to be very 
plausible. Such a theory would face a long list of counterexamples involving married men, of 
whom it would appear false to say that they are bachelors. But DeRose points out that the 
theory might be defended by offering a WAM in its defence. Thus it may be argued that 
uttering (12) generates an implicature to the effect that Bill is unmarried. Therefore it is only a 
part of the warranted assertability conditions of (12) that Bill must be unmarried, but not a 
part of the truth conditions of utterances of (12). This means than an assertion of (12) is 
unwarranted if Bill is married, but not false. On the basis of these considerations DeRose 
concludes that we should not adjust our original estimate of the plausibility of the theory in 
question, but rather question the legitimacy of the WAM made in its defence. 
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6.2 
                                                
Criteria for a Plausible Candidate for a WAM 
DeRose does not go as far as to argue that it is never legitimate to appeal to considerations 
involving warranted assertability when defending a semantic theory. He accepts that there are 
circumstances in which a WAM is both legitimate and appropriate, but argues that we should 
distinguish between plausible and implausible candidates for a legitimate WAM. In order to 
distinguish plausible candidates from implausible candidates, DeRose presents three criteria 
that must be satisfied for a WAM to be a plausible candidate for a legitimate WAM. These 
three criteria provide the focus of the discussion in this section. 
 DeRose (2002, p. 175) points out that one problematic feature of the illegitimate 
WAM used in defence of a theory that entails that (12) and (13) have the same truth 
conditions is that it relies on special rules associated with the expression ‘is a bachelor’. 
 
(12) Bill is a bachelor. 
(13) Bill is a man. 
 
The contrast DeRose draws is between the sort of WAM that relies on special rules associated 
with the expression in question on the one hand, and WAMs that exploit general rules of 
conversation, exemplified by the Cooperative Principle and the conversational maxims 
formulated by Paul Grice (1991a), on the other. Only instances of the latter sort, those 
involving appeal to general conversation rules, are candidates for being an effective and 
legitimate WAM. This is one the criteria that must be satisfied in order to have a plausible 
candidate for a WAM, according to DeRose, and it effectively imposes a constraint on the sort 
of WAMs that are legitimate.32
DeRose makes a connection between this point and the earlier point that a WAM 
could be used in defence of any semantic theory, no matter how implausible it might initially 
appear. He points out that ‘it’s not so easy to generate the implicatures you need to deflect the 
apparent counterexamples to your theory by means of general conversational rules that can be 
tested on very different sentences’ (DeRose 1999, p. 200; 2002, p. 176). By introducing a 
constraint on the sort of WAMs that one can legitimately appeal to, it becomes harder to 
 
32 I am going to understand DeRose’s criteria as imposing necessary conditions that a WAM must satisfy in 
order to be a plausible candidate for a legitimate WAM. However, this reading may be too strong. It would for 
instance rule out the possibility of an explanation in terms of conventional implicature, and one might not want 
to rule out this in the case of for instance ‘but’ even though one does not necessarily think that ‘but’ should be 
understood in this way. That being said, I propose, for the purpose of the present discussion, to ignore these 
complications. 
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explain away the force of putative counterexamples with the help of WAM, thus removing the 
threat of such a practice undermining the evidence for semantic theories in general. 
DeRose (2002, p. 197 n. 16) takes the distinction between WAMs that rely on special 
rules and WAMs that rely on general rules, to correspond to Grice’s (1991a; 1991b) 
distinction between conventional implicatures and conversational implicatures.33 Whereas 
conventional implicatures are determined by the meaning of the words alone, conversational 
implicatures depend on the assumption that speakers are observing the Cooperative Principle 
and the conversational maxims. When a hearer is attempting to work out what was 
conversationally implicated, she relies on the meaning and the referents of the words used by 
the speaker, information about the context and background information, the Cooperative 
Principle and the conversational maxims, and the assumption that the relevant information is 
available to both the speaker and the audience, (Grice 1991a, p. 31). 
The next question is where this leaves us with respect to the case of ‘know’. DeRose 
claims that invariantists have not offered a WAM based on general conversational rules. Thus 
the WAM made in defence of invariantism fails to satisfy the criterion for being a legitimate 
WAM. In fact, DeRose (2002, p. 176) argues that invariantists have often settled for pointing 
out the possibility that our intuitions are a result of mistaking a variation in warranted 
assertability conditions for a variation in truth conditions, without invoking any 
considerations involving general rules of conversation to support claim. 
DeRose also states further criteria for having a plausible candidate for a WAM. 
According to DeRose’s (1999, p. 198) second criterion, a WAM is more plausible in cases 
where there are conflicting intuitions. Such cases involve the intuition that both an utterance u 
of a sentence S and an utterance u' of a sentence not-S seems false, or at least somewhat 
wrong. Consequently, there is a pressure to explain away the intuition of falsity with respect 
to either u or u'. DeRose points out that in the case of the expression ‘is a bachelor’ there is no 
such conflict. An utterance of (12) is intuitively true if Bill is an unmarried man, and false if 
he is not an unmarried man. Thus there is no pressure to explain away either of the intuitions. 
However, it is not clear that this criterion poses a problem for a WAM made in 
defence of invariantism. As Jessica Brown (2005, p. 283; 2006, p. 411-413) points out, the 
Bank Case and the Airport Case appear to involve conflicting intuitions. These cases reveal 
that an utterance of a sentence containing ‘know’ may appear to be true as uttered in one 
context, and false as uttered in another context, despite the subject being in the same, or at 
                                                 
33 I am ignoring the possibility of implicatures that are neither conventional, nor conversational, throughout this 
discussion. 
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least similar, epistemic position with respect to a true proposition in both contexts. While the 
contextualists offer a means of resolving this apparent contradiction by arguing that ‘know’ is 
a context sensitive expression, Brown argues that to claim that these cases do not involve 
conflicting intuitions on these grounds amounts to begging the question against invariantism. 
Turning to DeRose’s third criterion, DeRose (1999, p. 199; 2002, pp. 192-193; 2005, 
pp. 174-175) considers it more difficult to explain away intuitions about the truth of 
utterances by means of a WAM than it is to explain way intuitions about the falsity of 
utterances. He argues that asserting a falsehood while implicating something true still counts 
as unwarranted or inappropriate. ‘For, except where we engage in special practices of 
misdirection, like irony or hyperbole, don’t we want to avoid falsehood both in what we 
implicate and (especially!) in what we actually say?’ (DeRose 2002, pp. 192-193). There are 
many ways in which an assertion may be unwarranted even though it is true, for instance by 
being irrelevant to the on-going conversation or implicating something false. In these cases 
we might mistake the assertion being unwarranted for it being false. On the other hand, 
DeRose claims that there are not correspondingly many ways in which an assertion may be 
warranted even though it is false. 
DeRose claims that this poses a problem for any WAM in defence of invariantism 
since contextualists appeal to both the intuition that DeRose’s utterance of (5a) in Bank Case 
A is true, and the intuition that his utterance of (5b) in Bank Case B is true, and not just the 
intuition that (5a) would be false as uttered in Bank Case B. Similarly, with respect to 
 
(5a) I know that it’ll be open. 
(5b) Well, no, I don’t know that it’ll be open. 
 
Cohen’s Airport Case, where an invariantist WAM would have to explain away either the 
intuition that Smith’s utterance is true, or the intuition that Mary and John’s utterance is true. 
Either way, the invariantists are forced to explain away intuitions about truth, and not just 
intuitions about falsity (DeRose 1999, p. 201; 2002, p. 193). 
One might object that it is not clear that a WAM in defence on invariantism must 
explain away both intuitions about truth and falsity. Someone taking this line of response may 
appeal to the sort of data mentioned in section 4.1 and argue that it is not natural for DeRose 
to go as far as to utter (5b) in Bank Case B, and similarly, with respect to the Airport Case 
where Mary and John goes as far as uttering (6b). The objector could claim that it would be 
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more natural for DeRose to utter something like (7a) in a context like the one in Bank Case B 
(see section 4.1 for more alternatives). 
 
(6b) Smith doesn’t know that the plane will stop in Chicago. 
(7a) I think I know that it’ll be open, but I’d better go in and make sure. 
 
While this line of response may have merit, it turns on finding support for the claim that it is 
unnatural for DeRose to go as far as to utter (5b). Contextualists claim that DeRose’s 
utterance of (5b) in the Bank Case is intuitively true and natural given the higher stakes in that 
context. 
But is the asymmetry between intuitions about truth and intuitions about falsity 
plausible in the first place? Stanley (2005, p. 123 n. 8) takes a sceptical attitude towards this 
alleged asymmetry. He notes that it makes a distinction between intuitions about the truth of 
assertions of negated propositions on the one hand, and the falsity of assertions of non-
negated propositions on the other, and he finds this distinction uncomfortable. Stanley appears 
to make an intuitive point, but he does not discuss DeRose’s motivation for the asymmetry 
between intuitions about truth and intuitions about falsity. 
Brown (2005, p. 284; 2006, pp. 413-415) however, argues that a false utterance may 
appear true when it is warranted in the sense that what it pragmatically imparts is true, either 
because the conversational participants focus on what is pragmatically imparted, or are 
mistaken about the relationship between what is pragmatically imparted and the truth 
conditions of the utterance. When speakers are concerned with communicating something that 
is true, it is not clear that they should worry about their utterance being strictly speaking false. 
It is possible to take this point further. For DeRose’s criterion to be plausible it seems 
that language users must be sensitive to the truth conditions of utterances, and whether the 
utterance semantically expresses something true or something false, even when they are 
focusing on what the utterance pragmatically imparts. Otherwise, there would be no reason 
not to think that a false utterance could appear to be true because it pragmatically imparts 
something true. But this comes dangerously close to assuming what is under discussion, 
namely the contextualist contention that we are not liable to confusing warranted assertability 
and truth in the cases at hand. 
This means that the criterion that a plausible candidate for a WAM should be based on 
general rules is left to do most of the work in ruling out a WAM in defence of invariantism. 
The criterion that a WAM should be based on conflicting intuitions seem to be satisfied, and 
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the criterion that that a WAM should only explain away intuitions about truth does not appear 
to be plausible. 
 
6.3 A More Plausible Candidate for a WAM in Defence of 
Invariantism 
Patrick Rysiew (2001) has sought to meet DeRose’s challenge by providing a WAM that is 
based on general rules of conversation. While DeRose (2002) raises an objection against 
Rysiew’s account, I argue that the Brown’s (2005) attempt to provide a WAM based on 
general conversational rules avoids this objection. Therefore, I conclude that there is a 
plausible candidate for a WAM in defence of invariantism that satisfies the criterion that a 
WAM must be based on general rules. 
Rysiew (2001) defends a non-sceptical version of invariantism according to which an 
utterance of (5a) by DeRose comes out true in both Bank Case A and Bank Case B, and 
similarly with respect to the Airport Case, in which (6a) is true as uttered in both Smith’s 
context and Mary and John’s context. 
 
(5a) I know that it’ll be open. 
(6a) Yes I know – it does stop in Chicago. 
 
However, he argues that the intuition that (5a) is false as uttered in the context in Bank Case B 
and the intuition that (6a) is false as uttered in Mary and John’s context, can be explained 
without resorting to contextualism or an illegitimate WAM of the sort discussed in section 6.1 
and 6.2. 
 In attempting to explain our intuitions, Rysiew (2001, pp. 487-488) distinguishes 
between the proposition semantically expressed by an utterance of a sentence and the 
proposition, or propositions, pragmatically imparted by the same utterance. Whereas an 
utterance of a sentence containing ‘know’ semantically expresses only that the subject is in a 
good enough epistemic position to know the proposition in question, it may pragmatically 
impart that the subject is in a good enough epistemic position for the purpose of the context in 
question. It is this distinction that allows Rysiew to explain our intuitions. He claims that 
while the propositions semantically expressed by the relevant utterances of (5a) and (6a) are 
true, the propositions pragmatically imparted are false, and it is the latter that explains our 
intuitions. 
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 Developing his view further, and in more detail, Rysiew (2001, p. 488) adopts an 
understanding of the strength of the epistemic position of the subject in terms of the 
alternatives that the subject can rule out. According to this account, the subject of a 
knowledge ascription must be able to rule out any relevant alternatives to a proposition in 
order for the knowledge ascription to be true. This view bears important similarities to the 
versions of contextualism defended by Cohen (1988) and Lewis (1996).34 However, 
according to Rysiew’s position, the range of relevant alternatives is fixed and does not vary 
with context. 35 What counts as a relevant alternative to a proposition is determined by what 
normal humans treat as a likely counter-possibility to that proposition (Rysiew 2001, p. 488). 
What do vary with context according to Rysiew are the salient alternatives. The salient 
alternatives are those possibilities that the conversational participants have in mind in a 
particular context. According to Rysiew, ‘salience is the occasion-sensitive notion: it picks 
out, rather indiscriminately, features of speakers’ psychologies which accompany their 
everyday uses of “knows,” however idiosyncratic, unusual, and peculiar to the conversational 
setting’ (2001, p. 489). Thus the relevant and the salient alternatives need not be the same. 
But even though the salient alternatives have no bearing on the proposition semantically 
expressed by utterances of sentences containing ‘know’, they have bearing on the proposition 
or propositions pragmatically imparted. 
In applying this framework to the Bank Case, Rysiew (2001, p. 490) argues that 
DeRose is in a position to rule out any relevant alternatives, and that the proposition 
semantically expressed by an utterance of (5a) by DeRose would be true in both Bank Case A 
and Bank Case B. Furthermore, he argues that since the range of relevant and salient 
alternatives is similar in Bank Case A, the proposition pragmatically imparted by DeRose 
utterance is also true. On the other hand, in Bank Case B, while the relevant alternatives stay 
the same, there are other salient alternatives that DeRose cannot rule out, such as the 
possibility of the bank having changed its hours. An utterance of (5a) by DeRose would 
therefore pragmatically impart that he is in a position to rule out these alternatives, and 
consequently the proposition pragmatically expressed comes out false. Conversely, his 
utterance of (5b) pragmatically imparts the he is not in a position to rule out all the salient 
alternatives. 
 
                                                 
34 See section 2.2 for Cohen’s (1988) and Lewis’ (1996) views. 
35 Rysiew does not want to rule out the possibility of some variation in what counts as relevant. For example, he 
mentions the possibility of a variation associated with ‘know’ being a vague expression. He therefore takes 
himself to be proposing ‘a “fairly” invariantistic semantics for “know(s)”’ (Rysiew 2001, p. 489). 
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(5b) Well, no, I don’t know that it’ll be open. 
 
Even though the proposition semantically expressed by DeRose’s utterance of (5b) is false, as 
he is in a position to rule out all the relevant alternatives, the proposition pragmatically 
imparted by his utterance is true. 
Rysiew (2001, p. 491) takes his account to be supported by Grice’s (1991a, p. 27) 
maxim ‘Be relevant’ under the category of Relation, thereby satisfying DeRose’s criterion 
that a legitimate WAM should appeal to general rules of conversation. What is relevant to the 
conversation in one context may fail to be relevant in another context and vice versa, and the 
maxim of relevance calls for speakers to make their contributions relevant to the conversation 
at hand. Since what is relevant to the conversation in Bank Case B are the salient alternatives 
such as the bank having changed its hours, we cannot preserve the assumption that DeRose is 
observing the maxim of relevance unless we take his utterance of (5b) to pragmatically impart 
that he cannot rule out all the salient alternatives. Rysiew states the general point, 
 
It is, I claim, because speakers strive to conform, and are known to strive, to the maxim of Relation (and 
more generally, to [the Cooperative Principle]) that an utterance of the form “S knows that p” is 
naturally taken to communicate […] that S’s epistemic position is ‘good enough’ given the epistemic 
standards that are operative in the context in question. (2001, p. 491) 
 
He argues that adherence to the maxim of relevance explains why an utterance of sentence 
containing ‘know’ pragmatically imparts that the subject is in a good enough epistemic 
position for the purpose of the context in question, or in terms of his preferred framework, 
that the subject is in a position to rule out any salient alternatives to the proposition in 
question. Thus Rysiew makes a general point regarding the explanation of why DeRose’s 
utterance of (5b) pragmatically imparts that he is able to rule out salient alternatives such as 
the bank having changed its hours. Consequently, he is able to argue that his account is 
supported by considerations involving general conversational rules such as Grice’s maxim of 
relevance. 
 However, DeRose is not satisfied with Rysiew’s account. DeRose (2002, p. 198 n. 17) 
understands Rysiew as postulating that utterances of sentences containing ‘know’ have two 
meanings, a semantic meaning and a pragmatic meaning (i.e. the proposition semantically 
expressed and the proposition pragmatically imparted), and DeRose finds this feature of 
Rysiew’s account problematic. 
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I am highly suspicious of accounts that help themselves to two such meanings in the way Rysiew’s 
does, disliking not only the loss of economy in explanation, but also worrying that we will not be able to 
combat all manner of absurd theories about the truth conditions of various sentences if defenders of 
these theories are able to posit separate pragmatic meanings that do the work of accounting for usage in 
the troublesome cases, allowing their account of the truth conditions to sit safely off in the corner, out of 
the fray. (DeRose 2002, p. 198 n. 17) 
 
It is not entirely clear how to best understand DeRose’s objection to Rysiew. The problem 
does not appear to be that the proposition or propositions pragmatically imparted by utterance 
of sentences containing ‘know’ may be different from the proposition semantically expressed. 
DeRose accepts that what an utterance semantically expresses may differ from what it is used 
to pragmatically impart. Rather, DeRose seems to be objecting to Rysiew on the grounds that, 
according to Rysiew’s account, the pragmatic meaning is not explicable as generated by the 
semantic meaning together with general principles. He goes on to state that, ‘Of course, in 
some sense, we all must hold that our assertions carry meanings beyond what goes into their 
truth conditions. […] But I find such a claim unobjectionable when the second, pragmatic 
meaning is generated by the semantic meaning together with general principles’ (DeRose 
2002, p. 198, n. 17). While Rysiew’s account is supported by appeal to Grice’s maxim of 
relevance, DeRose focuses on these considerations as supporting Rysiew’s explanation of 
why we focus on the pragmatically imparted proposition and not proposition semantically 
expressed, rather than as explaining the proposition pragmatically imparted as the joint 
outcome of these considerations and the proposition semantically expressed. According to 
DeRose’s reading of Rysiew, the maxim of relevance explains why we focus on the 
proposition pragmatically expressed as that is what is relevant in the context. However, the 
maxim of relevance does not explain how and why the pragmatically imparted proposition is 
generated in the first place. Once again, DeRose raises the familiar worry that allowing 
explanations that postulate two meanings in the way that Rysiew’s account does will 
undermine the evidence for semantic theories by making it too easy to explain away putative 
counterexamples. 
 All the same, it does not follow that the invariantists cannot provide a WAM that does 
not involve postulating two meanings. Like Rysiew, Brown (2005) tries to develop a WAM in 
defence of a non-sceptical version of invariantism. But while Brown does not discuss 
DeRose’s argument against Rysiew, her account does not appear to involve postulating two 
meanings in the sense that DeRose finds objectionable. In developing her WAM, Brown 
makes use of the notion of strength of epistemic position. According to the invariantist 
position she defends, how strong the epistemic position of the subject must be for an 
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ascription of knowledge to the subject to be true does not depend on the context, as the level 
of strength required is invariant across different contexts. 
 Once again drawing on Grice’s maxim of relevance, it might be that in certain contexts 
a stronger epistemic position is relevant to the conversation at hand. Take for instance the 
context in Bank Case B in which an utterance of (5a) by DeRose seems false. According to 
the picture defended by Brown (2005, p. 281), it is a stronger epistemic position that is 
relevant in this context. Even though (5a) is true as uttered by DeRose in this context because 
he is in a strong enough epistemic for it to come out true, it is a stronger epistemic position 
that is relevant in this context. Asserting (5a) would therefore implicate that DeRose is in the 
stronger epistemic position relevant in this context, as his assertion would not be relevant to 
the conversation at hand. Because DeRose is not in the stronger epistemic position the 
implicature is false and the assertion unwarranted, despite (5a) being true as uttered in that 
context. 
 Brown (2005, p. 281) also follows Rysiew in understanding the strength of the 
epistemic position in terms of the range of alternatives that the subject can rule out.36 In the 
context in Bank Case B, where there is a lot at stake and DeRose’s wife has raised the 
possibility of the bank having changed its hours, a strong enough epistemic position to rule 
out possibilities such as this one is relevant. By asserting (5a) DeRose implicates that he is in 
a strong enough epistemic position to rule out the possibility of the bank having changed its 
hours, and since he is not, he thereby implicates something false. 
 The account offered by Brown does not appear to involve two meanings in the 
problematic sense. The implicatures she appeals to in explaining our intuitions about the cases 
are explicable as the joint outcome of the proposition semantically expressed, the general 
conversational rule of relevance, and features of the context. Thus understood her account is 
not susceptible to the objection that DeRose raised against Rysiew on the ground that 
Rysiew’s account was seen by DeRose as postulating two meanings. 
 
6.4 
                                                
Cancellability 
It therefore seems that there is a more plausible candidate for a WAM in defence of 
invariantism than DeRose is willing to acknowledge. Nevertheless, contextualists may point 
to other problems with the WAM proposed by Brown. In this section I will look at the 
 
36 It should be stressed that this is not the only way to develop the invariantist position. Brown (2006, pp. 424-
428) has also developed a WAM based on understanding the strength of the subject’s epistemic position in terms 
of the range of possible worlds across which the subject’s belief tracks the truth. 
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question of whether considerations involving the cancellability of conversational implicatures 
may supplement DeRose’s original criteria in an attempt to rule out a WAM in defence of 
invariantism. 
 On the assumption that the implicature she appeals to is a conversational implicature, 
as indeed seems to be the case, we should be able to cancel the implicature. If an utterance of 
a sentence conversationally implicates that p, the implicature should be cancellable, either 
explicitly by adding ‘but not-p’ or something similar, or contextually by finding a different 
context in which an utterance of the same sentence would not generate the implicature (Grice 
1991a, p. 39; 1991b, p. 44). But this may pose a problem for Brown, since arguably, the 
putative implicature generated by an utterance of (5a) by DeRose in the context in Bank Case 
B cannot be explicitly cancelled without making the utterance sound wrong or at least 
somewhat awkward. Consider (14) as an attempt to explicitly cancel the implicature. 
 
(5a) I know that it’ll be open. 
(14) I know that the bank will be open, but I can’t rule out the possibility of the
 bank having changed its hours so I’d better go in and make sure. 
 
Is there something wrong with (14) as uttered by DeRose in the context in Bank Case B? 
Intuitions may differ on this point. Cohen (1999, pp. 59-60) seems to be of the mind that an 
utterance like of a sentence (14) not only sounds awkward, but goes as far as to argue that 
‘We know, but we need to investigate further’ sounds inconsistent. He therefore argues that 
the putative implicature is not cancellable, and that the phenomena should instead be given a 
contextualist treatment. Rysiew (2001, p. 495) and Brown (2006, p. 428) on the other hand, 
do not find utterances like this uncomfortable, and argue that the putative implicature can in 
fact be explicitly cancelled. We are therefore left with conflicting intuitions regarding 
cancellation attempts like (14) with no clear, intuitive answer as to whether it is an acceptable 
way of cancelling the implicature. 
 Furthermore, Rysiew and Brown proceed to question the underlying assumption that 
an implicature must be cancellable without discomfort, arguing that we should not expect all 
conversational implicatures to be cancellable without discomfort. Brown claims that we 
should not expect the cancellation to be comfortable in the cases where speakers are mistaken 
or confused about the relationship between what an utterance semantically expresses and what 
it pragmatically imparts. 
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 As Rysiew notes, Grice’s own remarks do not adequately settle the matter. According 
to Grice’s formulation, ‘a putative conversational implicature that p is explicitly cancellable 
if, to the form of words the utterance of which putitatively implicates that p, it is admissible to 
add but not p, or I do not mean to imply that p’ (1991b, p. 44). But this does not make it clear 
when it is inadmissible to add ‘but not p’. Is it enough that the utterance is uncomfortable or 
does it have to be obviously inconsistent? Rysiew argues that the former condition is too 
strong. Consider (15b) as an attempt to cancel the implicature generated by an utterance of 
(15a) to the effect that they fell in love first and then got married. 
 
(15a) They fell in love and got married. 
(15b) They fell in love and got married, but not in that order. 
  
But (15b) sounds odd though not contradictory. It therefore appears that this conversational 
implicature is not cancellable without discomfort, assuming, and this seems quite plausible, 
that this is in fact a case involving a genuine conversational implicature.37 In the case of (14) 
it was noted that there are conflicting intuitions as to how uncomfortable it is. While Cohen 
claims that it sounds inconsistent, it is far from clear that this is the prevailing intuition and 
given the conflicting intuitions it is hard to argue that it is clearly contradictory. 
 It is worth adding that the focus of these considerations have been whether the putative 
implicature is explicitly cancellable. But there does not seem to be a similar problem in taking 
the putative implicature to be contextually cancellable. For instance, DeRose’s original 
utterance of (5a) in Bank Case A does not implicate that he can rule out the possibility of the 
bank having changed its hours. This means that to the extent that there is a problem with 
respect to the putative implicature that Brown appeals to being cancellable, it is only a 
problem with the implicature being explicitly cancellable. But as I take it that the above 
discussion demonstrates it is not clear that there is a problem at all. 
 
6.5 
                                                
A WAM for ‘Tall’ 
I take the conclusion of this discussion to be that DeRose’s criteria, even when supplemented 
by considerations about cancellability, fail to rule out the possibility that our intuitions about 
the Bank Case and the Airport Case can be given a post-semantic, pragmatic treatment, rather 
 
37 Stephen Levinson (1983, p. 108) for instance, argues that cases involving ‘and’ and a temporal sequence of the 
events should be given a treatment in terms of conversational implicature, and not for instance a treatment in 
terms of ‘and’ being ambiguous with one of its senses being equivalent to that of ‘and then’. 
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than a semantic treatment in terms of ‘know’ being context sensitive. However, it may be 
argued that rather than showing that our intuitions about the cases admit a pragmatic 
treatment, it shows that DeRose’s criteria are inadequate. In order to illustrate this point, I will 
provide a WAM in defence of the view that ‘tall’ is not a context sensitive expression. But 
rather than taking this to show that some further set of criteria is needed, I argue that this may 
instead be understood as illustrating the difficulty of providing a set of criteria that will serve 
the contextualists’ argumentative purposes. 
 As was noted earlier (section 5), the view that gradable adjectives such as ‘tall’ are 
context sensitive is almost, though not quite, universally accepted. If Tim is significantly 
taller than the average person, even if he is not exceptionally tall, an utterance of (16a) will be 
intuitively true in a context in which the conversational participants are discussing people of 
average height. 
 
(16a) Tim is tall. 
 
But (16a) is intuitively false if uttered in a context in which the conversational participants are 
discussing the height of professional basketball players and this is usually taken to provide 
evidence that ‘tall’ is context sensitive. An utterance of (16a) can be intuitively true as uttered 
in one context and intuitively false as uttered in another context. However, it may be argued 
that this is merely a result of mistaking considerations involving warranted assertability for 
considerations involving truth. Asserting (16a) in a context in which the topic of the 
conversation is the height of professional basketball players is unwarranted, even if (16a) is 
true as uttered in such a context. 
 Suppose that someone claims that an utterance of ‘S is tall’ is true if and only if S 
measures more than n meters where n does not vary with context, leaving the question of how 
the measuring is to be done and similar concerns aside. Suppose further that Tim measures 
more than n meters. In that case, an utterance of (16a) is true regardless of whether the topic 
of the conversation is basketball players or ants. Expanding the view under consideration, an 
utterance of ‘S is tall for a professional basketball player’ is true if and only if S measures 
more than n+ meters, where n+ is a higher number than n, and assume that while Tim 
measures n meters he does not measure n+ meters. Therefore an utterance of (16b) is false. 
 
(16b) Tim is tall for a professional basketball player. 
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In a context in which the conversational participants are discussing the height of professional 
basketball players what is relevant is whether someone measures n+ meters, not whether 
someone measures n meters. Thus an assertion of (16a) would not count as relevant in this 
context unless the speaker was taken to communicating something else, namely that Tim 
measures n+ meters. In other words, asserting (16a) implicates (16b). But since Tim does not 
measure n+ meters, (16b) is false. We are therefore in a position to explain the intuition that 
(16a) would be false as uttered in such a context by appealing to the generation of a false 
implicature. 
 This WAM is similar to the WAM used by Brown in defence of invariantism in that 
both are based on considerations about relevance. Contextualists may take this to indicate that 
it is this reliance on a maxim of relevance that is problematic. It might thus be argued that 
considerations about relevance are a too powerful explanatory tool when it comes to WAMs. 
However, it is not clear how this worry should be spelled out in more detail. It appears ad-hoc 
to claim that considerations about relevance cannot play a role in supporting WAMs in the 
way that considerations involving other conversational maxims can. Why should a WAM 
based on a maxim of relevance be taken to provide a less plausible explanation of our 
intuitions than a WAM based on another conversational maxim? 
 While this does not prove that there is no plausible criteria that will serve the 
argumentative purposes of the contextualist, I think that it illustrates the difficulty of 
providing such a set of criteria. Furthermore, I am not aware of any plausible criterion that 
could be used to strengthen or supplement DeRose’s criteria in the desired way. 
 
6.6 
                                                
The Sensitivity of Competent Language Users with Respect to 
the Semantic Workings of Their Own Language 
Contextualists might instead take the difficulties in finding a set of criteria that serves their 
argumentative purposes to motivate a sceptical stance towards WAMs in general, arguing that 
cases of conversational implicature are typically such that it is possible for language users to 
distinguish what an utterance semantically expresses from what it conversationally 
implicates.38 Such a line of argument may find support in Grice’s requirement that it must be 
possible to work out the presence of an implicature if it is to count as a conversational 
implicature. In working out the implicature the hearer is relying on a grasp of the proposition 
semantically expressed by the utterance in question, or to use Grice own words, ‘the 
 
38 This line of response may not be available to DeRose who employs a WAM in defence of his views about the 
truth conditions of epistemic possibility statements (DeRose 1999, pp. 196-197; 2002, p. 174-175). 
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conventional meaning of the words used, together with the identity of any references that may 
be involved’ (1991a, p. 31). But if a grasp of a the proposition semantically expressed by an 
utterance is a condition for being able to work out the implicature, this might be difficult if 
language users were subject to the kind of confusion that the effectiveness of a WAM would 
seem to require. 
In response to this line of argument it may be argued that Grice allowed for the 
possibility that an implicature can be intuitively grasped, and only required that it must be 
possible to supply the argument relevant to the working out of the implicature. Grice states 
that ‘even if it can in fact be intuitively grasped, unless the intuition is replaceable by an 
argument, the implicature (if any) will not count as a conversational implicature’ (1991a, p. 
31).39 Thus the objection may be taken to involve a too strong reading of Grice which leaves 
out the possibility that the implicature may be intuitively grasped. 
Furthermore, it seems that this objection, like DeRose’s distinction between intuitions 
about truth and intuitions about falsity (see section 6.2), presupposes a high degree of 
sensitivity in language users with respect to the distinction between the truth conditions of an 
utterance and what the utterance pragmatically imparts. But unlike DeRose’s attempt to 
distinguish between plausible and implausible candidates for a legitimate WAM, this line of 
argument amounts to a more thorough rejection of the idea that we are liable to confuse a 
variation in warranted assertability conditions for a variation in truth conditions. It therefore 
seems that our intuitions concerning the Bank Case and the Airport Case only provide 
evidence for contextualism on the assumption that language users are highly sensitive to the 
semantic workings of their own language. If language users are not sensitive to the semantic 
workings of their own language, why should we take them to be able to distinguish the truth 
conditions of an utterance from what the utterance pragmatically imparts even when the focus 
is on the latter? We are therefore left with the following conditional: If our intuitions about 
the Bank Case and Airport Case are to provide evidence for contextualism, then competent 
language users must be sensitive to the semantic workings of their own language. But as I will 
argue in section 7.3, the view that competent language users are sensitive to the semantic 
workings of their own language seems to be an untenable position for contextualists. 
 
                                                 
39 I am not concerned with the question of what is the correct interpretation of Grice, nor do I want to get into a 
general debate about how to understand this requirement on conversational implicatures. The point is merely to 
point to a possible response to the objection in question. 
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6.7 
                                                
Appendix: A Positive Argument for Contextualism Based on the 
Knowledge Account of Assertion 
In this section I will look at an attempt by DeRose (2002) to construct a positive argument for 
contextualism based on a contextual variation in the standards for warranted assertability and 
the knowledge account of assertion. I will also look at Brown’s (2005) response to this 
argument. The point of this section is to show that even though such an argument would be 
significant if successful, DeRose’s argument is not as compelling as it initially appears to be 
when it is spelled out in more detail and that contextualists are left with the original problem 
of ruling out the possibility that they are mistaking a variation in warranted assertability 
conditions for a variation in truth conditions. 
 The knowledge account of assertion (henceforth just ‘the knowledge account’) has 
been defended and developed by among others Timothy Williamson (1996, 2000, ch. 11), and 
I will follow DeRose in focusing on Williamson’s version of the knowledge account in the 
following discussion. According to Williamson (2000, p. 243), the constitutive rule of 
assertion is the knowledge rule. 
 
(The knowledge rule) One must: assert p only if one knows p.40 
 
According to the knowledge account the knowledge rule is the unique rule specific to 
assertion. This means that the knowledge rule is essential to the speech act of assertion and 
allows us to individuate it from other speech acts. 
 While a comprehensive discussion of the merits of the knowledge account is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, I think it is fair to say that the knowledge account has some intuitive 
plausibility. For instance, it explains why asking the questions ‘How do you know?’, and 
more aggressively, ‘Do you know?’, in response to an assertion constitutes a challenge. These 
questions constitute a challenge because only knowledge warrants assertion, and the absence 
of an answer would mean the absence of warrant (Williamson 2000, pp. 252-253). The 
knowledge account also promises to give an explanation of the version of Moore’s paradox 
involving ‘know’. There is something wrong with asserting ‘p, and I do not know that p’, 
even though it could very well be true. According to the knowledge account, to make this 
assertion warrantedly one would have to know that p and that one does not know that p, but 
 
40 See Williamson (1996, p. 494; 2000; p. 243). 
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this is impossible, thereby explaining why there appears to be something wrong with such 
assertions (Williamson 2000, pp. 253).41
 Since I will be discussing the knowledge account in connection with contextualism, 
the knowledge rule should be given an appropriate metalinguistic formulation.42 Cohen 
(2004, p. 486) has proposed the following metalinguistic version of the knowledge rule: 
 
(The knowledge rule*) S may assert p in C only if ‘S knows p’ is true at C. 
 
DeRose argues that the knowledge account, together with a contextual variation in the 
standards for warranted assertability, provides a strong, positive argument for taking ‘know’ 
to be context sensitive. 
 
If the standards for when one is in a position to warrantedly assert that P are the same as those that 
constitute a truth condition for “I know that P,” then if the former vary with context so do the latter. In 
short: The knowledge account of assertion together with the context sensitivity of assertibility yields 
contextualism about knowledge. (DeRose 2002, p. 187) 
 
The argument takes as one of its premises the connection between knowledge and warranted 
assertability stated by the knowledge account. Furthermore, the argument is based on the 
premise that there is a contextual variation in the standards for warranted assertability. But if 
there is a variation in the standards for warranted assertability and those standards are the 
same as the truth conditions of utterances of sentences containing ‘know’, then DeRose 
concludes, there must also be a variation in the truth conditions of those utterances. 
If sound, this argument would show a different route from the variation in our use of 
‘know’ revealed by our intuitions about cases such as the Bank Case and the Airport Case, to 
the context sensitivity of ‘know’. The argument for contextualism that have been the focus of 
the discussion so far is that our intuitions about the cases provide evidence for the context 
sensitivity of ‘know’ by revealing a variation in the truth conditions of utterances of sentences 
containing ‘know’. DeRose’s argument takes a more indirect route by arguing via the 
knowledge account and the variation in the standards for warranted assertability in order to 
establish the context sensitivity of ‘know’. As DeRose (2002, p. 188) points out, this 
                                                 
41 Williamson (2000, ch. 11) argues that the knowledge account has other advantages over its rivals as well. 
42 Hawthorne (2004, pp. 85-91) has argued that there is a tension between the knowledge account and 
contextualism. While ‘know’ is ascriber dependent (i.e. it depends on the context of utterance), whether someone 
has warrant to make an assertion is not. He argues that the problem remains even when the knowledge account 
has been given an appropriate metalinguistic formulation. However, I will not pursue this problem here, and I 
will assume that contextualists can appeal to the knowledge account. 
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argument, if sound, would not be vulnerable to the objection that it rests on the mistake of 
confusing warranted assertability for truth as the intuitions appealed to are intuitions about 
warranted assertability in the first place, leaving no room for a confusion of this sort. 
However, it is not obvious that the argument is sound when it spelled out in more 
detail. The first problem involves sensitive invariantism. Even granting the truth of the 
premises, there seems to be a problem with taking this as an argument for contextualism. As 
Thomas Blackson (2004) and Brown (2005) point out, the argument is not effective as an 
argument against sensitive invariantism because it does not establish that the variation 
revealed by the argument is due to the context sensitivity of ‘know’ rather than a sensitivity to 
features of the situation of the subject. The argument as it stands is therefore invalid as an 
argument for contextualism. DeRose (2004b) admits the failure of the argument to establish 
the truth of contextualism on its own, but argues that third-person cases, such as the Airport 
Case, still provide evidence against sensitive invariantism. 
The upshot of this is that it seems better to view DeRose’s argument as an argument 
against classical invariantism rather than an argument design to establish that ‘know’ is 
context sensitive on its own. It would still be significant if the argument could be made to 
work against classical invariantism, thereby ruling it out as an alternative to contextualism. 
However, on closer examination of the argument it is not clear that it succeeds in establishing 
even this conclusion. Brown (2005) has argued that DeRose’s also fails as an argument 
against classical invariantism. 
Brown identifies DeRose’s argument as having two premises. The first premise is that 
there is a contextual variation in how well positioned one must with respect to a proposition in 
order to be warranted in asserting that proposition. Brown (2005, p. 266) refers to the first 
premise as the ‘context sensitivity of assertion’, but since I prefer to reserve the label ‘context 
sensitivity’ for the phenomenon of semantic context sensitivity, I will instead refer to this 
premise as ‘the variability claim’. However, I continue to use Brown’s (2005, p. 266) 
formulation: 
 
(The Variability Claim) How well positioned one must be with respect to p to assert
    warrantedly that p depends on context. 
 
The variability claim draws support from cases like the Bank Case and the Airport Case. 
While we could warrantedly assert that p in a context like the one in Bank Case A, we could 
not warrantedly assert that p in a context like the one in Bank Case B, despite being just as 
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epistemically well positioned with respect to p in both contexts. This point is demonstrated by 
the original cases presented by DeRose and Cohen, but as the case of (17) illustrates, it 
applies equally well to sentences not containing ‘know’. 
 
(5a) I know that it’ll be open. 
(17) The bank will be open Saturday. 
 
In the context in Bank Case B the intuition is that DeRose cannot warrantedly assert either 
(5a) or (17), but in the context in Bank Case A both seem intuitively acceptable. 
 The second premise of the argument is the knowledge account. The knowledge 
account as stated above is the view that the knowledge rule is the unique, constitutive rule of 
assertion. However, the knowledge rule and the variability claim do not yield the desired 
conclusion for the contextualists. It is consistent with these premises that there are other rules 
governing assertion, thus leaving it open whether the variation in how well positioned one 
must be in order to make an assertion could be accounted for by a contextual variation in 
these rules. To make the argument valid we need to add a further premise in order to rule out 
the possibility of there being such rules. Brown (2005, p. 271) therefore attributes the 
following uniqueness claim to DeRose: 
  
(The Uniqueness Claim) The knowledge rule is the only rule governing how well      
    positioned one must be to assert p warrantedly. 
 
According to the version of the knowledge account defended by Williamson the 
knowledge rule is the unique rule specific to assertion, thus seemingly making the uniqueness 
claim a natural premise if one already accepts the knowledge account. Moreover, DeRose 
claims to be following Williamson in accepting something like the uniqueness claim, ‘I will 
join Williamson in holding that this [the knowledge rule] is the only rule governing assertion 
that has to do with asserting only what one is positioned well enough with respect to’ (2002, 
p. 180). It appears that DeRose has something very similar to the uniqueness claim formulated 
by Brown in mind when making this statement. However, it is not clear that this is what 
Williamson has in mind (Brown 2005, p. 273). Williamson states that, ‘There may be other 
evidential norms for assertion, if they can be derived from the knowledge rule and 
considerations not specific to assertion’ (Williamson 2000, p. 257). Williamson appears to 
accept that there may be other rules governing how epistemically well positioned one must be 
 58
with respect to a proposition to assert it, as long as these rules are not specific to the speech 
act of assertion. But this does not rule out the possibility that the variation in how well 
positioned one must be in order to make an assertion could be the result of a contextual 
variation in a rule that is not specific to assertion, but is derived from the knowledge rule 
together with more general considerations not specific to assertion. 
The contextualists might therefore want to go further than Williamson and claim that 
the knowledge rule is the only rule governing how well positioned one must be with respect to 
a proposition to assert it. However, this raises the question of how to motivate the stronger 
claim on behalf of the knowledge account. The view that the knowledge rule is the 
constitutive and individuating rule of assertion only requires the weaker view claim that the 
knowledge rule is the unique rule specific to assertion. The contextualists therefore need to 
find further motivation for making the stronger claim. 
Furthermore, by making a stronger claim on behalf of the knowledge account, the 
contextualists run the risk of making the knowledge account less plausible. For instance, 
Williamson (2000, p. 257) argues that the knowledge account can explain why it appears 
warranted to assert that p when one reasonably believes that one knows that p, despite p being 
false and consequently that one does not know that p. Given those circumstances, it is 
reasonable to believe that one has warrant to make the assertion, thus explaining why the 
assertion is reasonable without being warranted in the strict sense that it complies with the 
knowledge rule. It might otherwise be seen as a problem for the knowledge account that an 
assertion made under those circumstances appears to be warranted. However, this defence of 
the knowledge account rests on the ability to derive the reasonableness of asserting that p 
when one believes that one knows that p from the knowledge rule and considerations not 
specific to assertion. By arguing that the knowledge rule is the only rule governing how well 
positioned one must be with respect to a proposition to assert it, the contextualists would run 
the risk of undermining this defence of the knowledge account. 
Brown (2005, p. 274) also cites the rule of relevance, which states that one must make 
one’s contribution to the conversation at hand relevant, as an example of a rule not specific to 
assertion that might have to do with the epistemic position of the subject (see also section 
6.3). It might be that the subject matter of a conversation directly deals with the epistemic 
position of the conversational participants with respect to a certain proposition. In such a 
context, the rule of relevance would concern the epistemic position of the conversational 
participants. 
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In light of these problems, it is not clear why an invariantist should accept the 
uniqueness claim. But Brown (2005, pp. 274-278) outlines another strategy that contextualists 
might pursue in attempting to construct a sound argument against invariantism based on the 
knowledge account. According to this strategy, DeRose’s argument can be understood as 
involving a more restricted sense of ‘warrant’. Williamson says, ‘‘Warrant’ is used here as a 
term of art, for the evidential property (if any) which plays the role of property C in the 
correct simple account of assertion. This use need not correspond exactly to that of ‘warrant’ 
in everyday English’ (2000, p. 243). Following these remarks by Williamson, it might be 
argued that DeRose’s argument only concerns ‘warrant’ in the more restricted sense of 
whether an assertion complies with knowledge rule. 
By understanding ‘warrant’ in a more restricted sense, the uniqueness claim is no 
longer problematic as long as one accepts the knowledge account in the first place. The 
uniqueness claim is then understood as the claim that the knowledge rule is the only rule 
governing how well positioned one must be with respect to p to assert that p warrantedly, in 
the restricted sense of ‘warrant’ that one is one warranted in asserting that p if and only if one 
knows that p. However, in order for the argument to be successful, ‘warrant’ must be used in 
the same way throughout the entire argument. This point applies to the variability claim as 
well. But the cases appealed to by the contextualists were originally seen as providing 
evidence for the variability claim understood as involving ‘warrant’ in the ordinary sense, not 
in the restricted sense required in order to motivate the uniqueness claim. The contextualists 
are therefore left with the challenge of making sure that our intuitions about the cases track 
the warranted assertability conditions as involving ‘warrant’ in the restricted sense. Brown 
argues that ‘there is no reason to suppose that [the context sensitivity of assertion] concerns 
one particular dimension of evaluation of assertion’ warrant*, rather than reflecting a number 
of the different dimensions of evaluation’ (2005, p. 276). The challenge facing contextualists 
with respect to this problem is in many ways similar to the original challenge of making sure 
that our intuitions about the cases track the truth conditions, rather than the warranted 
assertability conditions, of utterances of sentences containing ‘know’. 
If Brown is right, there are two ways of construing DeRose’s argument depending on 
whether ‘warrant’ is understood in its ordinary sense or in a more restricted sense. If ‘warrant’ 
is understood as being used in the ordinary sense, then the contextualists can appeal to cases 
such as the Bank Case or the Airport Case in order to find support for the variability claim. 
However, it is difficult to motive the strong version of the uniqueness claim if one 
understands ‘warrant’ in this way. On the other hand, adopting an understanding of DeRose’s 
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argument according to which it involves ‘warrant’ as understood in a restricted sense 
undermines the evidence for the variability claim. In both cases, Brown argues that DeRose 
fails to provide a successful argument against invariantism, as the contextualists fail to 
provide sufficient support for either the uniqueness claim or the variability claim. I take it that 
Brown’s line of argumentation succeeds in undermining DeRose’s argument, and 
consequently, that we are left with the original problem of whether our intuitions about the 
cases reveal a variation in the truth conditions or the warranted assertability conditions of 
utterances of sentences containing ‘know’, as there is no available argument from the latter to 
the former. 
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7 Contextualism and Semantic Blindness 
 
 
Contextualism offers a straightforward way of accommodating our intuitions about the Bank 
Case and the Airport Case. But that does not mean that contextualism does not have any 
difficulties accounting for other features of our linguistic practices involving ‘know’. This 
raises questions about what contextualists should say about these features of our linguistic 
practices, and most significantly for the present purposes, how this relates to the contextualist 
attempt to argue that our intuitions about the Bank Case and the Airport Case provide 
evidence for contextualism. The main point of this section is to examine the issue of whether 
considerations about what Hawthorne (2004) calls ‘semantic blindness’ undermines the 
positive evidence for contextualism. In section 7.1 I present an argument by Hawthorne 
(2004) involving ‘know’ as it figures in the that-clauses of belief reports. Hawthorne argues 
that his argument demonstrates that contextualists are forced to acknowledge that competent 
language users display semantic blindness with respect to ‘know’. In section 7.2 I look at 
some further objections to contextualism considered by DeRose (forthcoming) that also aim 
to demonstrate that the contextualists must appeal to semantic blindness. I then present 
DeRose’s response to these objections and the claim that contextualists must posit semantic 
blindness. Having thus presented the objection to contextualism and DeRose’s response, I 
discuss whether these considerations involving semantic blindness undermine the positive 
evidence for contextualism in section 7.3. I connect this discussion with the discussion in 
section 6.5 where I argue that our intuitions concerning the Bank Case and the Airport Case 
only provide evidence for contextualism on the assumption that language users are highly 
sensitive to the semantic workings of their own language. 
 
7.1 Propositional Attitude Reports and ‘Know’ 
Hawthorne (2004) raises an objection to contextualism based on our use of ‘know’ when it 
figures in the that-clauses of propositional attitude reports, and more specifically, belief 
reports. He argues that when it comes to such reports, competent language users seem to rely 
on a disquotational schema for ‘know’. 
 
Disquotational Schema for ‘Knows’ (DSK). If an English speaker E sincerely utters a sentence s of the 
form ‘A knows that p’, and the sentence in the that-clause means that p and ‘A’ is a name or indexical 
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that refers to a, then E believes of a that a knows that p, and expresses that belief by s. (Hawthorne 
2004, p. 101)43
 
This schema allows us to take a sincere utterance of ‘S knows that p’ by a speaker A and 
truthfully report A’s belief by ‘A believes that S knows that p’. For instance, taking DeRose’s 
utterance of in (5a) Bank Case A, and assuming that his utterance is sincere, it appears that 
(18) is a correct way of reporting DeRose’s belief. 
 
(5a) I know that it’ll be open. 
(18) Keith DeRose believes that he knows that the bank will be open. 
 
But combining the disquotational schema for ‘know’ with the True Belief Schema which 
states that if S believes that p, then S’s belief is true if and only if p, causes problems for 
contextualism (Hawthorne 2004, p. 99). Suppose that we were in a situation similar to that of 
DeRose and his wife in Bank Case B, that is to say that we were in a context where there is a 
lot at stake and the possibilities of error are salient, and that we are considering DeRose’s 
situation in Bank Case A. If someone were to utter (19) in our context, and assuming the 
correctness of the contextualist verdicts with respect to the original Bank Case, the utterance 
would be false. 
 
(19) Keith DeRose knows that the bank will be open. 
 
However, given the disquotational schema for ‘know’ we can truthfully report DeRose’s 
belief by (18) as above, and since we are assuming that the belief expressed by DeRose’s 
utterance of (5a) in Bank Case A is true, the True Belief Schema delivers the conclusion that 
(19) is true. But since it was already declared that an utterance of (19) would be false as 
uttered in our context, this conclusion must be wrong. 
 Hawthorne (2004, p. 103) concludes that contextualists will most likely reject the 
disquotational schema for ‘know’ when faced with this argument. He points out that we do 
not adopt a disquotational schema in the case of familiar context sensitive expressions such as 
‘here’ or ‘today’. For instance, take a sincere utterance of (20) made several months ago. In 
this case I cannot use (21) to report the speaker’s belief since ‘today’ would refer to today not 
                                                 
43 DeRose (forthcoming) has suggested that the consequent of the disquotational schema for ‘know’ should be 
given a metalinguistic formulation. According to DeRose’s version the consequent would state that it is true to 
say of E that he ‘believes that A knows that p’. Though I retain Hawthorne’s original formulation I will follow 
DeRose on this point. 
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to the day when the speaker made the original utterance. I could only use (21) to report the 
speaker’s belief if we were speaking on the same day. 
 
(20) It is hot today. 
(21) She believes that it is hot today. 
 
However, Hawthorne argues that giving up the disquotational schema for ‘know’ is not to be 
taken lightly. He makes the following claim about the role of the disquotational schema for 
‘know’ in our ordinary practice of belief reporting: 
 
By contrast, it looks very much as if we do adopt something like [the Disquotational Schema for 
‘Knows’]. If for example, someone sincerely utters ‘I know that I will never have a heart attack’, we 
have no hesitation whatsoever in reporting the contents of his mind by claiming that he believes that he 
knows that he will never have a heart attack. That is how the verb ‘know’ seems to work. (Hawthorne 
2004, p. 101) 
 
Our ordinary practices involving belief reporting seem to reveal a commitment to the 
disquotational schema for ‘know’ whereas it does not in the case of ‘today’. But where does 
this leave us with respect to contextualism? Hawthorne argues that the most plausible 
approach for contextualists to take would be to invoke semantic blindness. As he puts it, 
‘There is a real sense in which users of the word ‘know’ are blind to the semantic workings of 
their language’ (Hawthorne 2004, p. 107). Thus the appeal to semantic blindness amounts to 
the claim that competent language users are even implicitly unaware of the context sensitivity 
of ‘know’ as is revealed by their apparent commitment to the disquotational schema for 
‘know’. 
 
7.2 
                                                
Comparative Judgements of Content and Metalinguistic Claims 
DeRose (2005; forthcoming) considers Hawthorne’s argument as well as two related 
objections to contextualism.44 I will go through these other objections before turning to 
DeRose’s response as he offers a similar response to both set of objections. The first objection 
DeRose considers is an objection from comparative judgements of content. It is argued that 
 
44 There are other, related objections that I will not discuss here. Stephen Schiffer (1996) has for instance argued 
that the contextualist solution to scepticism requires language users to be confused in a way that seems to 
involve semantic blindness, though it should be noted that Schiffer does not use the expression ‘semantic 
blindness’. There are also problems concerning ‘know’ as it figures in the that-clauses of speech reports (see e.g. 
Cappelen and Lepore 2005b, ch. 7). 
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when someone in a context like the one in Bank Case B utters (22), this appears to contradict 
an utterance of (19) made in a context like the one in Bank Case A. 
 
(19) Keith DeRose knows that the bank will be open. 
(22) Keith DeRose does not know that the bank will be open. 
 
But according to contextualism there is no contradiction here. Since the relevant utterances of 
(19) and (22) take place in contexts which differ with respect to those features which 
contextualists deem relevant to the context sensitivity of ‘know’, both utterances come out 
true and there is no contradiction. Again it is argued that this reveals that competent language 
users are blind to the context sensitivity of ‘know’. The case of ‘here’ provides a suitable 
contrast. An utterance of (23a) would not be taken as contradicting an utterance of (23b) 
unless they happened to take place in the same location. Thus competent language users do 
not display a similar semantic blindness to the context sensitivity of ‘here’. 
 
(23a) It is cold here. 
(23b) It is not cold here. 
 
DeRose also considers a related objection from metalinguistic claims. According to this 
objection, if the speaker uttering (19) and the speaker uttering (22) were informed of the 
utterance made by the other, they would both claim that the other speaker’s utterance was 
false. Again, this seems to reveal semantic blindness on the part of competent language users 
when it comes to the context sensitivity of ‘know’. If the speakers were aware of the context 
sensitivity of ‘know’ they would not claim that the other’s claim was false. By contrast, if the 
speaker of (23a) was informed of an utterance of (23b) taking place in a different location, he 
would not claim that the utterance was false, or would at least be clearly mistaken in doing so. 
 The first part of DeRose’s response to these objections is to try to mitigate the force of 
the intuitions behind the objections. He claims that the intuitions are less powerful when the 
cases are presented correctly. While he admits that the intuition that an utterance of (19) 
contradicts an utterance of (22) is quite strong when they are presented as taking place in a 
dispute between the two speakers, he insists that contextualists are not committed to the 
verdict that both utterances are true. What he advocates is a version of contextualism 
according to which the contribution of ‘know’ to the truth conditions of both utterances is the 
same (DeRose 2004a; forthcoming). He refers to this view as ‘single scoreboard semantics’: 
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‘On this view, there is a single scoreboard in a given conversation; the truth-conditional 
content of both speakers’ uses of “knows” are given by the score registered on this single 
scoreboard.’ (DeRose 2004a, p. 6). While the conversational score is liable to change as 
conversation moves forward, DeRose does not embrace a view according to which the 
conversational score changes drastically between speakers. He is therefore able to claim that 
since the contribution of ‘know’ to the truth conditions of both utterances follows the same 
conversational score, both utterances cannot be true.45, 46
 Furthermore, DeRose (2005, p. 194; forthcoming) claims that in the cases where 
contextualists do not take the speakers to be contradicting each other (i.e. cases without 
disputes), the intuitions that they do contradict each other is significantly weaker. Thus, when 
considering the speaker uttering (19) as occupying a context like the one in Bank Case A, and 
the speaker uttering (22) as occupying a context like the one in Bank Case B, with neither 
disputing the other’s claim, we should expect competent language users to be less inclined to 
take the speakers as contradicting each other. Similarly with respect to the objection from 
metalinguistic claims, the intuition that if the speaker uttering (19) and the speaker uttering 
(22) were informed of the utterance made by the other they would claim that the other 
speaker’s utterance was false, is much weaker when the speakers are not involved in a dispute 
(DeRose 2005, pp. 194-195; forthcoming). 
 DeRose (2005, pp. 196-197; forthcoming) also argues that similar considerations 
weakens the intuitions behind the disquotational schema for ‘know’. He describes a case in 
which Louise is at a tavern discussing whether Jim was at work yesterday with her colleagues. 
Based on the testimony of a reliable informant and seeing his hat in the hall, Louise sincerely 
utters (24a). 
 
(24a) I know that Jim was at the office yesterday. 
 
Louise utterance is intuitively true. On the other hand, one of her colleagues, Thelma, is being 
interview by the police who are investigating a serious crime and wants to know whether Jim 
                                                 
45 DeRose (2004a; forthcoming) favours the view that in cases of disputes like the one between the speaker 
uttering (19) and the speaker uttering of (22), both utterances lack a truth value. In these cases, the speakers 
would set the contribution of ‘know’ to the truth conditions of utterances of sentences containing it differently. 
DeRose (2004a, p. 18) admits that this amounts to a failure of bivalence, but does not think that this is a problem. 
46 DeRose (forthcoming) also extends this point to cases where the speaker uttering (22) is disputing an earlier 
utterance of (19) or vice versa. In this case only the latter utterance lacks a truth value. Note that this should 
make contextualists careful when presenting their cases. If Mary and John’s utterance are understood as 
disputing Smith’s earlier utterance of (6a) in the Airport Case by uttering (6b), their utterance could be regarded 
as having no truth value according to the view advocated by DeRose. 
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was at the office yesterday. Though Thelma has access to the same evidence as Louise, there 
is a lot more at stake in her context and she therefore proceeds to utter (24b). 
 
(24b) I don’t know that Jim was at the office yesterday. 
 
Again, the utterance seems to be intuitively true. But what if Thelma was asked by the police 
if Louise could provide more information regarding Jim’s whereabouts? Could Thelma, who 
is aware of Louise having sincerely uttered (24a), use (25) to correctly report Louise’s belief? 
 
(25) Louise believes that she knows that Jim was at the office yesterday. 
 
DeRose claims that this belief report appears to be wrong. The intuition that this would be a 
correct belief report is at least a lot weaker in this case. He further argues that this 
demonstrates that Hawthorne’s claims about the apparent commitment of competent language 
users to the disquotational schema for ‘know’ are based on a failure to look at the right sort of 
cases. 
 Based on these considerations, DeRose (forthcoming) argues that even if language 
users display semantic blindness with respect to ‘know’ this does not pose a problem for 
contextualism. Even if ‘know’ turns out not to be context sensitive, those language users 
whose intuitions match the contextualist verdicts with respect to the problematic cases would 
be subject to semantic blindness. Since the problematic cases for contextualism do not seem 
to yield clear intuitions one way or another, at least when presented correctly, there will be 
some language users whose intuitions turn out to be incorrect. Thus we have to accept that 
there is some semantic blindness whether contextualism is the correct view or not. 
 
7.3 Semantic Blindness and the Positive Evidence for 
Contextualism 
However, accepting semantic blindness on the part of competent language users may be more 
problematic for contextualists than DeRose is willing to admit. The problem is that semantic 
blindness threatens to undermine the positive evidence for contextualism. MacFarlane makes 
the following point: 
 
If ordinary speakers have a faulty grasp of the meaning of “know”, then we cannot confidently appeal to 
variability in the standards they require someone to meet in order to count as “knowing” as support for a 
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theory about the meaning of “know”. Yet these data are the primary evidence in favor of contextualism. 
(2005b, p. 215) 
 
If language users are blind to context sensitivity of ‘know’ with respect to problematic cases 
such as belief reports and comparative judgements of content, then why should we take their 
intuitions to be a reliable when it comes to cases such as the Bank Case and the Airport Case. 
Even if there is semantic blindness regardless of whether ‘know’ is context sensitive or not, 
there is still a problem for contextualism because contextualists are relying on the intuitions of 
competent language users to provide evidence that ‘know’ is context sensitive. 
 As it stands, it may be replied that MacFarlane’s objection ignores a crucial difference 
between cases such as the Bank Case and the Airport Case and the problematic cases 
involving belief reports and comparative judgements of content. While contextualists claim 
that our intuitions about the former cases are relatively clear and provides uniform support for 
contextualism, DeRose (forthcoming) has argued that our intuitions about the latter cases are 
far less clear and do not uniformly undermine contextualism (see section 7.2). Therefore, the 
contextualists may take the intuitions of competent language users about the Bank Case and 
the Airport Case to provide evidence for contextualism, despite the fact that the same 
language users display semantic blindness with respect to the problematic cases. 
 However, even granting this point, there may still be a problem for contextualism in 
taking competent language users to be blind to the context sensitivity of ‘know’. In section 6.5 
it was argued that our intuitions about the Bank Case and the Airport Case only provides 
evidence for contextualism on the assumption that language users are sensitive to the semantic 
workings of their own language. But this assumption is difficult to square with competent 
language users displaying semantic blindness. If competent language users are sensitive to the 
semantic workings of their own language, it is difficult to see how they could be affected by 
semantic blindness which amounts to being unaware of the semantic workings of their own 
language, and more specifically, the context sensitivity of ‘know’. It therefore appears that the 
position that the language users are sensitive to the semantic workings of their language is 
untenable for contextualists admitting that language users display semantic blindness. But in 
that case there is no reason to suppose that our intuitions about the Bank Case and the Airport 
Case provide evidence for contextualism. 
 Perhaps a case could be made that language users only display semantic blindness 
with respect to certain features of the language. It could thus be argued that language users are 
sensitive to the features of the language that are important in providing evidence for 
contextualism while at same time displaying semantic blindness with respect to other features 
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of the language. This line of response may have some merit with respect to Hawthorne’s 
objection involving ‘know’ as it figures in the that-clauses of belief reports as it could be 
argued that language users display semantic blindness with respect to such embedded uses of 
‘know’. However, this response does not help with the objection from comparative 
judgements of content and the objection from metalinguistic claims. These objections are 
based on how language users think about ‘know’ as it is used in other contexts and comparing 
the contents of different utterances of sentences containing ‘know’. But contextualist cannot 
argue that competent language users are liable to display semantic blindness when thinking 
about what is going on in contexts other than the one that they occupy. As was illustrated by 
Cappelen and Lepore’s arguments discussed in section 5, contextualists are relying on 
intuitions about what is going on in other contexts when using Impoverished Context Shifting 
Arguments to provide evidence for the context sensitivity of ‘know’. Therefore, if 
contextualists were to argue that such intuitions are liable to be the result of semantic 
blindness, they would undermine the evidence for contextualism. In conclusion, the problem 
remains. If language users display semantic blindness, it becomes difficult to argue that 
language users are sensitive to the semantic workings of their own language. But this 
sensitivity seems to be required if our intuitions about the Bank Case and the Airport Case is 
to provide evidence for contextualism. 
 Again, it may be that the best bet for the contextualists is to look for companions in 
guilt, and again it is gradable adjectives such as ‘tall’ that provide a suitable candidate. In 
section 6.5 I argued that a WAM is available in defence of the view that ‘tall’ is not a context 
sensitive expression. Furthermore, our practices seem to betray as much commitment to the 
disquotational schema for ‘tall’ as it does for ‘know’ (DeRose forthcoming). If someone 
sincerely utters (16a) it seems that I can use (26) to report her belief. 
 
(16a) Tim is tall. 
(26) She believes that Tim is tall. 
 
This seems to present a dilemma if one thinks that the argument against contextualism that I 
have presented in this section is convincing, but also thinks, as most do, that gradable 
adjectives such as ‘tall’ are context sensitive. This is because there seems to be an analogous 
argument that can be used to undermine the evidence for the context sensitivity of ‘tall’. 
However, this in itself does not solve the problem for contextualism as it does not show where 
the argument goes wrong, but only proposes to present a dilemma. It also raises questions 
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about whether the case of ‘tall’ and ‘know’ are as analogous as contextualists claim.47 I do not 
propose to offer any conclusions as to the right way out of this dilemma as my concern is with 
the debate about the evidence for the context sensitivity of ‘know’, not with gradable 
adjectives. I am therefore content with having presented an argument that purports to 
undermine the case for contextualism based on our intuitions about the Bank Case and the 
Airport Case. 
                                                 
47 Hawthorne (2004, p. 104) is aware of the worry that his argument could be used against gradable adjectives as 
well, and worries that it shows that his argument proves too much. His response is to insist that there are more 
clarificatory devices available in the case of gradable adjectives than there is in the case of ‘know’ and that this 
makes for a relevant difference. I do not wish to enter into a debate about Hawthorne’s response, except to note 
that his claim that we have fewer clarificatory devices in the case of ‘know’ has been challenged (DeRose 
forthcoming). See also Ludlow (2005) for suggestions about clarificatory devices in the case of ‘know’. 
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8 Summary and Conclusions 
 
 
I began this discussion with a presentation of contextualism and two cases that contextualists 
take to provide evidence for the thesis that ‘know’ is a context sensitive expression: DeRose’s 
Bank Case and Cohen’s Airport Case. These cases form the central part of the contextualists 
attempt to provide evidence for the context sensitivity of ‘know’ that I have been discussing 
here. Initially these cases may seem to provide strong evidence for the context sensitivity of 
‘know’. Whereas an ascription of knowledge is intuitively true in one context, a denial of 
knowledge with respect to the same true proposition and the same subject, or a similarly 
epistemically positioned subject, is intuitively true in another context. Contextualists can give 
a straightforward account of this variation in our intuitions by appealing to the context 
sensitivity of ‘know’. Different utterances of the same sentence containing ‘know’ may have 
different truth conditions, and a sentence containing ‘know’ may therefore be true as uttered 
in one context, but false as uttered in another. 
 However, as I take it that the discussion demonstrates, matters are more complicated 
than they might initially appear to be. In section 4 I looked at data involving our use of 
‘know’ that goes beyond the cases that contextualists typically appeal to. In particular, I 
discussed Stanley’s (2005) Ignorant High Stakes cases and how these cases can be made to fit 
with a plausible version of contextualism. This discussion raises questions about how 
contextualism should be developed, and the constraints placed on contextualism by general 
assumptions about the nature of context sensitive expressions. More specifically it raises the 
question of how the contribution of ‘know’ to the truth conditions of utterances of sentences 
that contain it is determined. I also discussed the worry that the Bank Case and the Airport 
Case are not psychologically realistic because they ignore the effects of the higher stakes on 
the confidence of the participants and that this, rather than the context sensitivity of ‘know’, 
may be the source of our intuitions. This connects with the discussion about the Ignorant High 
Stakes cases, since these cases would provide contextualists with a way of removing this 
worry. While I do not feel obliged to offer any definitive conclusions with respect to these 
matters, I think that they illustrate the need for contextualists to be clearer on how 
contextualism is to be developed and implemented if these questions are to be resolved. These 
questions become even more pressing given the discussion in section 6, since contextualists 
cannot take our intuitions about these cases to be the result of semantic blindness, but need to 
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find another way of accommodating them that does not make language users ignorant of the 
semantic workings of their language. 
 I further pursued the connection between contextualism and more general assumptions 
about semantics and context sensitivity in section 5. In this section I relied heavily on 
Cappelen and Lepore’s (2003; 2005b) arguments concerning context shifting arguments to 
bring out some of the assumptions behind the contextualist argumentation based on our 
intuitions about the Bank Case and the Airport Case. In relying on cases such as the Bank 
Case and the Airport Case, contextualists assume that our intuitions about cases like these are 
semantically significant. This has further consequences for questions about context sensitivity 
in general, such as the question of how large the set of context sensitive expressions is. 
 What I take it that discussion in section 4 and section 5 reveal, is that providing 
evidence for contextualism is not simply a matter of finding a pair of cases that reveal the 
correct sort of variation in our intuitions about utterances of sentences containing ‘know’. 
These matters are connected with more general questions about semantics and context 
sensitivity, and contextualists need to make potentially controversial assumptions about these 
matters in order to provide evidence for the context sensitivity of ‘know’. The contextualist 
attempts to argue our intuitions reveal a variation in the truth conditions of utterances of 
sentences containing ‘know’ may therefore be challenged by calling these assumptions into 
question. However, rather than pursuing these general questions about context sensitivity and 
semantics, the rest of my discussion have focused on a more specific alternative to treating 
our intuitions as revealing a variation in the truth conditions of utterances of sentences 
containing ‘know’. 
 The main part of the thesis involves the question of whether our intuitions about the 
Bank Case and the Airport Case reveal a variation in the truth conditions of utterances of 
sentences containing ‘know’, or whether they can be given a post-semantic, pragmatic 
explanation in terms of a variation in warranted assertability conditions. DeRose defends 
contextualism on the grounds that such an explanation could be given with respect to any 
attempt to provide evidence for (or against) a semantic theory. He proposes a set of criteria 
that will restrict the use of such explanations and rule out the possibility that our intuitions 
about the Bank Case and the Airport Case can be thus explained. However, I argued that the 
attempts to provide a plausible set of criteria that rules such an explanation, fails. Based on 
this I further argued that in order for our intuitions about the Bank Case and the Airport Case 
to provide evidence for contextualism, contextualists must assume that competent language 
users are be sensitive to the semantic workings of their own language. 
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 In section 7 I connected these issues with issues concerning semantic blindness. In the 
light of certain objections to contextualism it seems that contextualists have to admit that 
competent language users display semantic blindness with respect to ‘know’. However, I 
argued that contextualists cannot hold that competent language users display semantic 
blindness as that would undercut the assumption that language users are sensitive to the 
semantic workings of their own language, and thus undermine the positive evidence for 
contextualism. 
 Where does this leave us with respect to the evidence for contextualism? If successful, 
the argument demonstrates that our intuitions about the Bank Case and the Airport Case need 
not be taken as providing evidence for contextualism. However, it should be noted that some 
caution is called for in drawing sweeping conclusions at this point. It was noted that an 
analogous argument could be used to undermine the evidence for the context sensitivity of 
‘tall’. This may or may not be problematic depending on one’s position with respect to the 
context sensitivity of gradable adjectives, and may raise the suspicion that the argument 
proves too much. 
 Furthermore, it is important to stress that the argument does not purport to show that 
contextualism is false. Even if successful, the argument only undermines the positive 
evidence for contextualism. Nor does the argument rule out the possibility that there are other 
ways of providing evidence for contextualism that does not involve the assumption that 
language users are sensitive to the semantic workings of their own language. 
 Having said that, I think that the argument reveals a serious problem for contextualists 
seeking to provide evidence for the context sensitivity of ‘know’. On the one hand 
contextualists want to claim that competent language users are sensitive to the semantic 
workings of their own language, but one the other hand they appeal to semantic blindness 
when faced with intuitions that are problematic for contextualism. But according to the 
argument I have presented, there is a tension here that threatens to undermine the evidence for 
contextualism, and in the end it is far from clear that we must treat our intuitions about the 
Bank Case and the Airport Case as providing evidence for the context sensitivity of ‘know’. 
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